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This dissertation explores the theoretical foundation and empirical 
significance of the social resource model of political participation, an approach 
that views political participation as an outcome of individuals’ use of social 
resources created by social connectedness. 
Building on the decomposition of the concept of ‘social capital,’ I 
explicate the mechanisms through which non-political resources—formal 
membership, social trust, talk and tolerance—function to facilitate political 
behaviors. In addition, I examine how such social resources enhance or 
substitute for other resources that are already established as individual-level 
determinants of political participation, such as formal education or mass 
media use. 
I employ three datasets that include measures of social and individual 
resources with respect to political participation: The Social Capital Benchmark 
Survey (2000), the National Election Study (2002), and the American Citizen 
Participation Study (1990). 
Results show that political (dis)engagement can be meaningfully 
explained by understanding why some people are better or more poorly able 
to utilize certain forms of social resources, regardless of or beyond their 
individual capabilities or options. It is important to note, however, that  
different forms or dimensions of social relations contribute differently not 
only to the generation of social resources but also to political mobilization. In 
addition, this dissertation shows that social resources reinforce the effects of 
individual capital on political participation. Most of all, the structural and 
communicative forms of social resources add to the political reservoir of those 
who are highly educated. The significant interaction effects of television use 
and social resources support television’s ‘time displacement’ and ‘worldview’ 
explanation of participation inequality. In future research, the nexus where 
social resources meet individual resources should be the focal point for the 
study and development of the social resource model of political participation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A SOCIAL RESOURCE MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:  
NEED, POTENTIAL, AND CHALLENGES 
 
Individual vs. Social Explanations of Political Participation 
Political participation as a basis of democratic citizenship has been 
traditionally understood as the result of rational choices made by individuals 
who are motivated, informed, and capable to participate. Empirical studies 
have subsequently focused on the extent to which individual-level variables 
account for both the willingness to take part in various political activities and 
the efficacy required to do so; it has been generally observed that people who 
are politically interested, efficacious or optimistic are more willing to 
participate (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982, p.146; Finkel, 1985; J. M McLeod, 
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele & Shah, 2000; Uslaner, 1998); those who are 
politically well-informed and knowledgeable, through mass mediated or 
interpersonal informational channels, tend to participate more (J. M McLeod 
et al., 1999; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993); and individuals with socioeconomic 
advantages are more competent to participate (Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Nie, 
Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Verba & Nie, 1972). Among these studies it has 
been observed that the motivational, informational, and socioeconomic 
variables that affect individual choice with regard to participation were either 
mediating or moderating each other’s influence (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; J. 
M McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, 1999a, 2002). 
Looking at political participation—or the lack of it—as a function of 
these individual-level influences has, however, left as much room for 
challenges and contradictions as for acceptance of their explanatory powers. 
 
2
On the one hand, despite growth in the levels of formal education and 
political information, the political arena has been struggling to attract 
participants, in particular those who are well motivated and rich in resources 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Nie et al., 1996; Patterson, 2002). From the 
rational choice perspective, on the other hand, political participation was 
regarded as an irrational outcome. That is, since the cost of participation is 
usually high and the benefit of participation is often collective, rational and 
self-interested individuals would opt for a free ride on others’ involvement 
instead of investing their own resources (Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965; Riker & 
Ordeshook, 1968). 
Researchers in both political science and political communications 
began therefore to seek alternative mechanisms by which the much 
complicated democratic participatory process can be better described. Among 
other things, relational and social contexts in which individual choices are 
made and behaviors take place drew particular attention. For example, 
Uhlaner (1986; 1989) proposed that motivations for individuals to take part in 
political activities could be modified by sociability or group consciousness 
that add incentives to narrow self-interest. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
(1995) modified the focus on individual resources and re-formulated it into a 
‘civic voluntarism model’ in which networks of recruitment – being asked to 
participate – play an equally important mobilizing role. The social settings of 
communication and discussion networks also emerged as significant 
determinants of the flow of political information, which in turn had an 
important impact on participation (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2002; 
Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Scheufele, Nisbet, & Brossard, 2003; Scheufele, 
Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004). This shift of attention to social factors  
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indeed made up for the remaining deficiencies of individual capabilities or 
motivation alone with respect to different levels of political participation; 
political participation does occur as a rational outcome and the lack of it may 
well be overcome when mobilized by socially-interested factors. 
Nevertheless, full understanding of democratic citizenship still remains 
restricted, because individual identity is likely to be lost in the movement 
toward focusing on the social-level variables, just as emphasizing too much 
individual-level variables has in the past underestimated the influence of 
social contexts. Therefore, as long as each of these seemingly distanced factors 
is held accountable for only a partial aspect of political (dis)engagement, the 
complete picture will never be revealed. Given consensus on the point that 
political participation should be approached as a mix of individual choices 
and social influences, we need a theoretical strategy that accounts for the 
social attainability of political mobilization without losing sight of individual 
influences. 
 
Political Participation and Social Resources 
A recent development in sociology specifically acknowledges the 
coexistence of individual and social influences in explaining human actions. 
According to Granovetter (1985), this approach takes the middle ground 
between two distinct ways of understanding human actions and their 
consequences. 
 
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor 
do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular 
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their 
attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relation (p.487).  
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James Coleman (1988; 1990) noted that this ‘embeddedness’ of individual 
choices in social relations can be realized while individuals utilize specific 
resources. Defining these resources as ‘social capital,’ he posited that they 
function to “facilitate certain actions of actors within the social structure that 
in its absence would not be possible or could be achieved only at a higher 
cost” (p.S98; p.304).1 Considering the civic and political contexts, Putnam 
(1993) further refined the concept to mean “features of social organization, 
such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society 
by facilitating coordinated actions” (p.167). And most significantly, these 
social-relation-based resources were expected to be particularly effective in 
solving problems that lack collective cooperation, often called ‘dilemmas of 
collective actions,’ ‘the prisoner’s dilemma,’ ‘the free-rider problem,’ or ‘the 
tragedy of the commons’ (Coleman, 1988, 1990; G. Hardin, 1968; Putnam, 
1993). Accordingly, the results of higher levels of social capital were usually 
associated with benefits or gains in productivity, efficiency, or cooperativeness 
(Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Paxton, 1999; 
Putnam, 2000; Teachman, Paasch, & Carver, 1997). 
Researchers who were particularly interested in revealing how an 
individual’s participatory behavior in the political arena could be facilitated 
by these social resources have examined the roles of what they have termed 
                                                 
1 Coleman’s definition of social capital is uniquely functional. He 
further elaborated on this definition thusly: “Social capital is defined by its 
function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two 
elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and 
they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure” (p.S98); “The 
function identified by the concept “social capital” is the value of the aspects of 
social structure to actors, as resources that can be used by the actors to realize 
their interests” (p.S101). 
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distinctively as “social capital serving civic ends” (Putnam, 1995b), “politically 
relevant social capital” (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998), or “political capital” 
(Fuchs, Minnite, & Shapiro, 2000). What these concepts had in common was 
that political participation may well be approached from a social capital or 
collective action perspective, distinctively from the rational individual’s 
perspective as traditionally adopted. According to Knack and Keefer (1997), 
individual participation in political matters is regarded as ‘civic duty’ based 
mainly on cooperative norms or social expectations with less regard to cost 
and benefit. Along the same lines, Smith  (2002) argued that political 
disengagement is a problem of “too few opportunities and resources, or too 
little cooperation upon shared interests” rather than too much individual 
freedom to avoid participation. 
Based on his account of the result that undermines collective action 
logic, Coleman (1990) offers a rationale that supports locating political 
participation as an outcome of social resources. According to him, both the 
free-rider behavior and the opposite of it, “an excess of zeal,” occur under the 
same structure of interests where the interests of all are realized by the same 
outcome. What determines the prevalence of zealous involvement over free-
riding is whether or not additional incentives exist “to reward the others for 
working toward the outcome” (p.275). In other words, the work of social 
resources, i.e., encouraging others or providing positive sanctions, explains a 
unique aspect of political participation that otherwise would have been simply 
avoided.  Smith (2000) argued further that individuals are capable of altering 
situations not only by just ‘reacting’ to these resources, but by ‘acting’ 
cooperatively and pooling resources to overcome the perverse incentives. In 
summary, taking social relations into consideration beyond individual-level  
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influences of capability, motivation or information can redefine issues of 
political participation in terms of the abundance or lack of available social 
resources. 
 
Problems with the Use of Social Capital 
Initially attractive because of its conceptual simplicity and normative 
effectiveness, the concept of social capital was readily employed in a variety of 
social fields dealing with collective problems in family, education, economy, 
or government, as well as community (see review by Woolcook, 1998). And it 
was often suggested that, in order to solve collective problems, policy should 
be developed around strategies that can encourage active utilization of 
resources, for only their effective use can generate further values. 
Despite the popular acceptance of the concept as a useful analytical 
tool, however, critics have pointed out that the concept has been largely 
“undertheorized and oversimplified” (Foley & Edwards, 1997, p.551) or 
“misused and abused” (Greeley, 1997, p.587), causing both conceptual and 
empirical controversies. At the conceptual level, the functional definition of 
the concept was attributed to the failure to properly differentiate its 
multidimensionality (Greeley, n.d.; R. Hardin, 1999). That is, by mixing ‘what 
it is’ with ‘what it does,’ it was argued that the source and the derived benefits 
are blended together or too closely connected, resulting in conceptual 
‘tautology or truism’ (Edwards & Foley, 1997; Portes & Landolt, 1996 
May/June). Levi (1996) also suggested that virtuous interrelationships should 
be reassessed because the term may well be simply a description of an auto-
correlated relationship, like connecting, for example, civic communities with 
doing civic things. Therefore, unless the constitution of the concept is properly  
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disaggregated and sorted out, the concept will remain in a state of 
“amorphously” covering varied causal relations under a single term (R. 
Hardin, 1999) or, in other words, “mean everything and nothing” (Greeley, 
1997, p.588). 
Empirically, on the other hand, research interest has been extremely 
unbalanced because it has centered on debates over what the level of social 
capital has been and what has caused it to be at that level, rather than on 
efforts to reveal what social capital actually does or how it does it. This trend 
stems from Putnam’s positing an erosion of social capital over the years and 
recapitulating it as the phenomenon of “bowling alone” (Putnam, 1995a, 1996, 
December, 2000)2. Although Putnam’s conclusion was stated definitively, as 
he claimed that “by virtually every conclusive measure, social capital has 
eroded steadily and sometimes dramatically over the past two generations” 
(Putnam, 2000, p.287), so were the critiques. Ladd (1996) challenged him with 
contradictory evidence and concluded that “not even one set of systematic 
data support the thesis of bowling alone” (p.1). Though not completely 
negated, the thesis has been criticized for lack of plausibility and for being 
superficial and dubious (Greeley, n.d.; Paxton, 1999; Samuelson, 1996). In 
particular, Putnam’s failure to capture some of the current improving trends 
in civic life was also criticized (Skocpol, 1999, July/August; Wills, 2000, July), 
                                                 
2 “More Americans are bowling today than ever before, but bowling in 
organized leagues has plummeted in the last decade or so . . . . The rise of solo 
bowling threatens the livelihood of bowling-lane proprietors because those 
who bowl as members of leagues consume three times as much beer and pizza 
as solo bowlers, and the money in bowling is in the beer and pizza, not the 
balls and shoes. The broader social significance, however, lies in the social 
interaction and even occasionally civic conversations over beer and pizza that 
solo bowlers forgo” (Putnam, 1995a, p.70). 
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so the rhetoric of “decline or disappearance” should be replaced with that of 
“mutation” (Lemann, 1996, April), “return to normalcy”  (Schudson, 1996, 
March/April), or “churning” (Ladd, 1999). 
Subsequently, scholars were concerned with the lack of empirical 
attention on the ‘productive’ aspect of the social capital concept. In order for 
the concept of social capital to be developed into a coherent model or theory of 
social resources, it was argued that studies should look into the mechanisms 
through which social resources are utilized and in turn help to resolve the 
collective problems, beyond describing what they are (Levi, 1996; Lin, 2001a; 
Newton, 1997). 
 
Toward a Social Resource Model of Political Participation 
Given the need for, the potential of, and challenges to the social 
explanation of political participation discussed so far, this dissertation 
attempts to validate the theoretical foundation and the empirical significance 
of the social resource model of political participation: an approach to political 
participation as an outcome of individuals’ use of social resources created by 
social connectedness. By examining how non-political resources can explain 
the individual-level outcomes, i.e., political behaviors, this model is expected 
to shed new light on the puzzling mechanism of political (dis)engagement. 
The highly controversial concept of social capital will also be made more 
acceptable as a coherent analytical tool after undergoing a thorough 
clarification in theoretical and empirical terms. 
To carry out this goal, Chapter 2 will be devoted to a threefold 
exploration of the conceptual foundations relevant to the building of the social 
resource model of political participation. First, I will address how the most  
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generally discussed aspects of social relations—formal membership, social 
trust, talk, and tolerance—constitute different forms or dimensions of social 
capital. Next, I will examine the patterns of interrelationships among these 
different forms or dimensions. In particular, I will consider not only the 
widely assumed cyclical pattern but also the less recognized possibility of 
conflicting relationship that occur in the course of being grouped together.  
Building on the decomposition of the concept, I will try to reveal the 
mechanisms through which these non-political resources are functioning to 
facilitate political behaviors. In addition to considering individual 
contributions to political mobilization, I will pay special attention to 
examining how mutual or uncooperative relationships are reflected in those 
mechanisms. 
Lastly, yet most significantly, the role of social resources in political 
mobilization will be further elaborated with reference to the moderating role 
of social resources. As implied by its definition, the value of social resources 
depends, to a large degree, on the availability of other types of resources. 
Following this point, I will examine whether and how social resources could 
enhance or substitute for other resources that are already established as the 
individual-level determinants of political participation, such as formal 
education or mass media use. 
In Chapter 3, I will develop several research questions dealing with the 
key issues examined in the discussions of Chapter 2. As introduced above, the 
rationale for appealing to social resources in response to issues concerning 
political participation can be sustained by the specific ways in which the three 
building blocks necessary for the model are arranged. That is, this process 
begins with concept explication followed by its application to the political  
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context. Only then does it lead to a modification of the model that accounts for 
the interplay with other resources. For this reason, I will propose sets of open 
questions instead of assuming concrete hypothetical relationships.  Answering 
such questions will be critical in moving forward to the next level. 
Chapter 4 describes the data sets and measurements of key variables 
for the analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 present results and conclusions, respectively.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
STEPS FOR BUILDING A SOCIAL RESOURCE MODEL OF  
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
This chapter comprises three parts addressing the key issues involved 
in building a social resource model of political participation. First, the concept 
of social capital will be explicated to identify how social resources are 
constituted. Next, I will examine how these resources at the social levels are 
utilized to facilitate participatory behaviors at the political level. Finally, the 
link connecting social resources and political participation will be further 
elaborated to include the interplay between social resources and individual 
resources. 
 
Construction of Social Capital: 
Dimensions and Interrelationships of Social Resources 
As noted earlier, the usage of social capital in general has suffered from 
“lack of clarity about the meaning of the key term and a failure to appropriate 
the complexities of the theoretical tradition” (Foley & Edwards, 1997, p.551). 
To unravel the mix-ups and rebuild them into an integrated social resource 
model, it is necessary to identify different “forms” of social relations that “can 
constitute useful capital resources for individuals” (Coleman, 1988, p.S102). 
Distinguished from a specific behavioral consequence, the general 
construction of social capital is divided into two sub-dimensions: the structure 
and the values created. 
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Structure of Social Relations: Formal Membership 
The first of the abovementioned sub-dimensions refers to locating 
where relational resources actually reside or inhere: the structure of relations 
between and among persons. Although it is less tangible compared with other 
forms of capital existing in actual persons or certain productions, this 
dimension of social capital is embodied through networks of connection or 
memberships in formal or informal associations (Coleman, 1988, 1990). 
For social relations to be capitalized independently, Bourdieu (1983) 
emphasizes that individuals need to strategically invest their time and effort 
in establishing networks of relationships. Fukuyama (1995) also points out 
that social capital is manifested by “spontaneous sociability,” the capacity to 
form formal associations and to thrive in organizational settings. Therefore, 
the more associational connections people have, the richer and more diverse 
are the resources mobilized by individuals for their use. For this reason, the 
structure of relations was described as the “quantitative” dimension (Paxton, 
1999) or, in a narrower sense, the “organizational or network capital” (R. 
Hardin, 2000). 
It is significant to note that, in being capitalized, organizational settings 
make a difference in types of interactions, the quality of bonding, and the 
effectiveness of the cooperative outcome. As Putnam (2000) noted, it is 
important to differentiate the “machers” who tend to invest in formal 
connections and the “schmoozers” who are more likely to participate in 
informal networks (pp.93-94). And it was usually formal types of relations 
based on weak ties of acquaintanceship, rather than social connections that are 
based on vertical relationships or strong informal ties among friends or family,  
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that sustained cooperative values and increased the possibility of obtaining 
new resources (Lin, 2001b; Putnam, 2000). 
 
Values of Social Relations: Social Trust, Talk, and Tolerance 
Despite being fundamentally structural in nature, structural existence 
alone cannot address how or why social resources work to bring about certain 
outcomes. It was suggested therefore that the production of social capital be 
considered as a function of “cultural components” (Edwards & Foley, 1997) or 
of the “subjective and qualitative” (Paxton, 1999) dimension of social relations, 
which can fill the functional gap left unexplained solely by networks of 
connection (DeFilippis, 2001). Newton (1997) argues that this dimension 
constitutes specific norms or values that transform somewhat “self-seeking 
and egocentric” members to care more about collective interests. 
Among many norms and values that are capable of assuming this role 
at the individual level, three forms of relational values are identified here: 
social trust, talk, and tolerance. On the surface, they may look irrelevant to 
each other and the extent to which these forms are materialized or qualified as 
social capital values may vary. They can be tied together, however, as by-
products of social relations. 
Social Trust. The issue of trust emerges from the fundamental 
assumption that social capital is based primarily on relationships with others. 
This implies that such a reciprocal situation inherently involves uncertainty 
because the generation of benefits depends more on the actions of related 
persons, not on those of the actor himself. According to Coleman (1990), this 
type of “voluntary decision-making under risk” (p.99) can be dealt with 
exclusively in terms of “trust” (p.91). Therefore, trust in his account is  
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characterized as ‘rational’ and ‘information-based’; the decision to maintain or 
break a trusting relationship depends on the actors’ calculating possible losses 
or gains in order to maximize utility under the risk. 
Building on the work of Coleman, Putnam (1993) distinguishes ‘social 
trust’ from ‘personal or thick trust’ and emphasizes two unique sources. The 
first is what he calls a “generalized reciprocity” that can be summed up as “I’ll 
do this for you now, knowing that somewhere down the road you’ll do 
something for me” (Putnam, 1993, pp.182-183). That is, the short-term altruism 
grounded on the expectation of a long-term benefit can facilitate cooperation 
and make trusting relationships easier to maintain while suppressing self-
interest or opportunism. Social trust also arises from the second, structural 
source of networks of engagement. According to Putnam, associational ties 
not only allow members to verify and uphold the trustworthiness of their 
environment in the course of interacting with other members, but they also 
provide a reputational motivation to be trustworthy. 
A key characteristic of such network-based social trust is that it is 
“transitive” and can be “spread” across society in general (Putnam, 1993, 
p.169). According to Dasgupta (1998), this extension of trust is possible 
because personal experiences with trusting people serve as evidence for quasi-
statistical inferences about trust in society at large. Levi (1996, 1999) suggests a 
behavioral approach to the transition of trust. A decision to trust someone, 
according to her, is made by low personal investment in learning or 
monitoring the trustworthiness of others; “the greater the investments, the 
greater the distrust” (1999, p.6) . Therefore, one tends to make a heuristic 
decision or to project one’s own trustworthiness to others without much 
deliberation. And it is the associational experience that provides people with  
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safe grounds to broaden the boundary of trust to others more generally with 
relative ease and at low cost. 
A number of scholars support the view of trust as a property of social 
relations. For example, Grenovetter (1985) argues that trust should be 
“embedded” in concrete and personal relations. Cook and Hardin (2001) also 
make it clear that networks of ongoing interactions provide the grounds for 
trust or trustworthiness and, consequently, for cooperation. In an 
“encapsulated-interest” view of trust, Hardin (1993b, 2002) describes trust as 
an expectation that others will fulfill a shared interest in maintaining the 
relationship. On this account, trust is ‘rational’ in that it is in the same 
cognitive category as knowledge, and ‘risky’ due to the uncertainty involved 
when it is used as a ground for action. And for these specific reasons Hardin 
(1993a; 1993b) claims that the boundary of trust should be limited to people, 
not extending to government or other institutions. 
Talk. The informational potential that inheres within social relations is 
also a vital source of action in general (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and of 
cooperative behavior in particular (Putnam, 1995a, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
communicative aspect of relationships that convey information has been a 
largely ignored social capital asset (Eliasoph, 1998, 1999). 
Talking with others based on social relations has unique informational 
value in two respects. First, it is relatively less costly to access and acquire 
information, compared with the cost of mass-mediated information, which 
usually requires some level of cognitive skill or psychological effort to access 
and process the information. Talking with others has long been identified as a 
low-cost information-gaining device (Granovetter, 1973; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 
1955) for its occurrence in a far less demanding and more natural  
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environment, often interwoven with other subjects and contexts. As opposed 
to the unequal acquisition of mass-mediated information favoring or 
disallowing access to certain segments of the population (Barnhurst & Mutz, 
1997; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; J. P. Robinson & Davis, 1990; Tichenor, 
Donohue, & Olien, 1970), informational value tends to expand to wider 
segments of the population as conversational relations diversify. According to 
Coser (1975), when individuals meet with different role sets within diverse 
relations, they learn how to deal with the complexity of the relations. In order 
to embrace such diversity, she argues, conversational patterns are adjusted, 
becoming more elaborate, intellectually flexible and universally accessible. 
Second, interpersonal discussion conveys information in a more 
understandable format and content. Conversations are capable of pre-
selecting, summarizing, and repeating key information, tailoring messages to 
the partners or to specific contexts in the course of interactions. According to 
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987), network-based talking is the only source of 
socially transmitted information that is responsive to the social and political 
context. Talking with others also provides additional information for those 
who need to “clarify potential ambiguities in the media accounts” (Scheufele, 
2002, p.52), reinforcing, complementing, or even replacing the effects of mass-
mediated information on certain outcomes (McLeod et al., 1999). 
Talking with others—even in the most trivial forms of gossip—in a way 
that provides informational value was believed to be capable of establishing 
and reinforcing collective norms by transmitting encouragement and rewards 
(Coleman, 1990, chap. 11) or by offering opportunities for “[testing] the 
veracity of different views” and in turn avoiding reliance on self-interest or 
impulse (Putnam, 2000).  
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Tolerance. In a weak sense, tolerance is defined as the belief in every 
citizen’s equal right to express his or her ideas and views (Nie et al., 1996; 
Verba et al., 1995). More broadly, tolerance is a willingness to extend liberties 
and protection even to disliked or hated groups (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, 
Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). Despite its seeming relevance to trust and open 
communication, the viability of tolerance as a social capital asset was more 
often in question and this has made tolerance the most controversial case in 
the debate over social capital. 
To those who dispute the value of tolerance as social capital, it is more 
likely to be a source of what has been called a “dark side or downside” of 
social capital that is explicitly at odds with other social values. Analyses of the 
trend data have shown that, while the level of tolerance has been rising rather 
than cooperatively decreasing, people have become more and more 
disconnected from civic life or from one another over the years (Cigler & 
Joslyn, 2002; Nie et al., 1996; Putnam, 2000). In this light the increase in 
tolerance was interpreted as a manifestation of the rise of individualism to the 
detriment of organizational solidarity (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1996 
May/June; Schudson, 1998). The cross-sectional evidence was even more 
troublesome. Several scholars have pointed out that strong inside solidarity or 
in-group bonding could produce an adverse side effect of cliquish attitudes 
toward outer groups (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000, pp.22-23). Thus, those who 
were more connected via organizational memberships were not necessarily 
more tolerant (Ikeda, 2002; Paxton, 1999; Stolle & Rochon, 1998). 
According to Sullivan et al. (1982) and Mondak and Sanders (2003), 
however, any increase in the level of tolerance was shown to be marginal or 
modest at best when tolerance was re-conceptualized and re-measured more  
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validly. Then, its contrast with civil connection was not dramatic enough to 
signify a negative relationship with social capital in general. Putnam (2000) 
argued as well that positive, or at least non-negative, correlations between 
tolerance and civic engagement are more common in many empirical studies. 
Furthermore, tolerance is well qualified as a legitimate or even essential 
element of social capital for its functional similarities to other relational 
values, such as social trust or talk. For example, the need to reduce prejudice 
and to tolerate diverse lifestyles or attitudes often extends beyond those who 
share immediate contact or even beyond disliked groups (Pettigrew, 1997; 
Stolle & Rochon, 1998), just as social trust was viewed as an extension of 
knowledge-based or particular trust (Dasgupta, 1998; Levi, 1996; Putnam, 
1993). And some of the affective or personality variables, such as self-esteem 
(Zellman & Sears, 1971), psychological insecurity (Bobo & Licari, 1989) or trust 
(Gibson, 1987), were found to make this transition easier. Being tolerant is also 
related to an enhancement of information flow in that it makes discussion or 
debate open to unpopular or unorthodox views (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 
1995). According to Mutz (2002a), those who are exposed to the diverse and 
oppositional views of others they talk with are more likely to learn how to 
sustain social interactions by refraining from acting for self-interest and 
accepting or even respecting the divergent interests of others. Several scholars 
explained this cognitive mechanism of learning to tolerate by reference to the 
educational effect on threat perception or cognitive sophistication. That is, as 
people have more years of formal schooling, they perceive others as less 
threatening (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978), and 
become more open-minded to new ideas and more willing to risk uncertainty 
(McClosky & Brill, 1983). In sum, social virtues that arise from interacting with  
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others are, at least, rarely associated with lack of tolerance, on either the 
cognitive or affective levels. 
 
Interrelationships among Social Resources 
Once the structural and values dimensions of social capital were 
identified as above, whether and in what manner the various forms of social 
capital are related to each other emerges as an important question. 
Virtuous Circle. In general, various forms of social capital in different 
dimensions are regarded as self-fulfilling and mutually reinforcing each other 
because they are tied together as resources derived from social relations. 
Putnam (1993) adopted what Hirschman (1984) termed as “moral resources” 
to explain this relationship. That is, resources like “morality, civic spirit, trust, 
observance of elementary ethical norms” are atypical in that they increase 
rather than decrease through use, and atrophy rather than stabilizing if not 
used (p. 93). Therefore, practice of one form of social capital is likely to 
stimulate the breeding of other forms or dimensions. This interdependence 
was thought to contribute to either the creation and maintenance of social 
capital, constituting a “virtuous circle,” or the destruction of social capital, 
forming a “vicious circle” (Putnam, 1993). 
Support for this mechanism has been found in many studies that 
examined the proposition advanced by Putnam (1993) that designated 
networks of engagement as a primary source of social trust, or what Stolle 
(1998) specifically referred to as a “micro-theory of social capital.” And the 
results showed that associational or civic engagement was significantly 
associated with the increase in social trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Scheufele & 
Shah, 2000; Shah, 1998). Although others validated the reverse relationship,  
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i.e., trusting people are predisposed to participate (Fukuyama, 1995; Newton, 
1997; Uslaner, 1998), explaining associational participation as a simple 
function of trust was relatively less convincing because trust alone was likely 
to overlook the additional motivation to join, i.e., “the actual needs that 
persons have for help, the existence of other sources of aid and the degree of 
affluence” (Coleman, 1990, p.307). Therefore, Jackman and Miller (1998) 
argued that trust should be “endogenized” to, i.e., treated as being influenced 
by, membership in order for the social capital argument to be theoretically 
productive. 
Many scholars also supported the idea that political conversation can 
be socially acquired through networks of memberships (Simonson, 1996; 
Verba, 1965; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). The role of formal membership was 
particularly effective among those “who may not otherwise be linked” 
(Davison, 1988, p.14) by “utilizing social arrangements and set-ups” (Menzel, 
1971, p.406). 
Since being tolerant of different ideas and ideologies is a learned 
attitude or judgment, people’s perceptions of certain groups has been found to 
be directly influenced by how the surrounding information negatively or 
positively portrays them (Gibson, 1987; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & 
Wood, 1995; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). When direct framing 
information was not available or applicable, participation in voluntary 
associations and a subsequent increase in opportunities for joining 
heterogeneous discussion networks were found to play a vital role in 
developing tolerance (Mutz, 2002a; Scheufele et al., 2004) or preventing 
partisanship from leading to intolerance  (Cigler & Joslyn, 2002). At the 
cognitive level, exposure to the diverse or oppositional views of others  
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enhanced people’s awareness of the rationales for the differences (Stouffer, 
1955; Sullivan et al., 1982). It also developed norms or attitudes that are 
conducive to maintaining tolerance, such as “cross-cutting solidarity” 
(Kornhauser, 1959), conversational etiquette, or the civility of “not saying” 
(Kingwell, 1995). On the other hand, Pettigrew (1997) pointed out that group 
affiliation tended to develop intimacy among members first, as a result of 
which political differences are recognized later with less gravity. 
Dark Side of Social Capital. To some scholars, however, the “win-win 
sets of relationship” (DeFilippis, 2001p. 786) among different forms of social 
resources are neither clear-cut nor always possible (Foley & Edwards, 1997; 
Greeley, 1997; R. Hardin, 2003; Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1996 
May/June). According to this perspective, social capital is inherently neutral 
or conflict-ridden and may well contribute to polarization rather than 
cooperation. Coleman (1988)’s version of social capital explicitly addresses the 
context-specific and non-interchangeable nature of these resources: “[A] given 
form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be 
useless or even harmful for others” (p.98). Hardin (2003) also disallows any 
normative valence of social capital because it is simply about “means of doing 
things” (p.21). Especially given the prevalence of unequal access to the various 
forms of resources, Foley and Edwards (1997) assert that social capital can 
range “from asocial to antisocial to broadly prosocial” (p.552). Therefore, it is 
equally or more likely that cyclical relationships will be broken rather than 
revolve. 
In fact, studies have shown how it is characteristic of various forms or 
dimensions of social resources to work against the virtuous circle thesis. Most 
of all, formal memberships were found to bear no relation to social trust  
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(Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Newton, 1999b; Uslaner, 
2002). Alternatively, less formal associations, such as family, workplace or 
school relations, played a more significant role in generating trust (Foley & 
Edwards, 1996; Levi, 1996; Mutz & Mondak, 1998; Newton, 1997). Two factors 
with respect to both formal membership and social trust explain these results. 
First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to materialize relationships as a result of 
formal membership because involvement in voluntary associations tends to 
occur “too late in life to shape their fundamental disposition” (Uslaner, 2002, 
p.41), and to exist only as “short-lived effects in one’s lifetime” (Stolle, 1998, 
p.521) accounting for “only a minority of activities” (Newton, 1997, p.579). 
Second, associational membership fosters trust that is fundamentally different 
from social or general trust; it is restricted to or ‘particularized’ toward in-
group members only (Cohen, 1999; Stolle, 1998; Uslaner, 2002). Proponents of 
social capital assume that trust developed within such networks naturally 
spills over to society in general (Dasgupta, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Levi, 1996, 1999; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). However, 
making the leap from particular experience to general faith is based on “little 
evidence and a shaky theoretical foundation” (Uslaner, 2002, p.44) and needs 
to be tracked over time if it is to be explained (Stolle & Rochon, 1998). 
Moreover, positive in-group trust or ‘thick’ trust was found to be transformed 
into strategic hostility toward out-groups, precluding the development of 
social trust (Granovetter, 1973; Uslaner, 2002). 
Findings were also contradictory regarding sources of information. 
Participants in voluntary associations were not necessarily political talkers 
(Eliasoph, 1998; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Mutz & Mondak, 1998). 
According to Pollok (1982)’s study, talking about politics in the non-political  
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settings of voluntary associations was found to be secondary to or to deviate 
from the primary organizational activities; those who were highly involved in 
the non-political activities of the organization were less likely to talk about 
politics. Wyatt et al. (2000) also found that political conversation occurred 
more frequently in private or personal settings partly because of the greater 
sensitivity of certain issues in public settings. 
Circular relationships involving tolerance seem more volatile. Although 
organizational interactions or discussion networks were believed to imbue 
diversity, leading to tolerant attitudes, they did not always provide dissimilar 
views or foster diversity (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Mutz & Martin, 2001; 
Verba, 1965). Therefore, when cross-cutting exposure did not result in cross-
cutting solidarity due to a strong sub-culture or in-group bonding, as in 
religious groups (Beatty & Walter, 1984; Stouffer, 1955) or political 
organizations (Stolle & Rochon, 1998), tolerance was not facilitated. 
 
Social Resources and Political Participation 
As pointed out earlier, defining social capital uniquely by reference to 
its function has misguidedly included particular benefits or gains in 
productivity, efficiency or cooperativeness as component indicators 
representing social capital. Many scholars argue, however, that this dimension 
of social capital should not be part of the definition, but should instead be a 
reference to ‘what it does,’ an outcome of capitalization (Lin, 2001a; Newton, 
1997; Paxton, 1999; Portes, 1998). 
Explicating the social capital concept in this manner—separating the 
outcome from the structure or the values of social relations—makes it possible 
to locate political participation as a specific outcome of social relations. It then  
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becomes important to examine how the general constitution of social 
resources actually functions to facilitate political participation. 
Before examining these relationships, three terms that are often used 
interchangeably should be distinguished: social capital, civic engagement, and 
political participation. Putnam (1995b) described civic engagement as 
“people’s connections with the life of their communities,” and political 
participation as “relations with political institutions” (p.665). While generally 
referring to social capital in terms of “relations with one another,” he 
addressed special forms of social capital that “serve civic ends” to deal with 
civic or political engagement (p.665). Despite these efforts, it was still difficult 
to differentiate those terms, causing further confusion. For instance, he treated 
civic engagement both as a ‘civic association’ that “embodies and creates” 
social capital (1995b, p.665) and more generally as ‘civic participation,’ parallel 
to political participation, as a behavioral consequence at the civic or 
community level (2000, chap. 2). In other studies, civic engagement was 
treated as either a structural indicator or an individual-level sub-dimension of 
social capital (Moy, Scheufele, & Holbert, 1999; Scheufele & Shah, 2000). In 
some other cases, especially those dealing with local politics, civic 
participation or even social capital were mixed with political participation 
(Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Scheufele & Shah, 2000). As Smith (2002) 
noted, however, one should be wary of equating civic participation 
undertaken for the sake of political issues with political participation in 
general, because social investments that encourage general political 
participation— political expertise—can be different from or even in 
contradiction with those that encourage civic engagement involving political 
issues—locality.   
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Social Resources Facilitating Political Participation 
At the relocation of political participation to fit into the concept of social 
capital, it is appropriate to ask: How can resources at the social level be 
utilized to facilitate participatory behaviors at the political level? Just as 
different forms of social relations were differently qualified with respect to the 
generation of social resources, their politicizing functions are also expected to 
vary or, as Kanck and Keefer (1997) suggest, even be “counteractive” (p.1248). 
In what follows, therefore, the extent to which each dimension or form of 
social relation relates to political mobilization will be examined. 
Membership and Political Participation. The foundation of the linkage 
between civic association and political participation stems from the so-called 
‘principle of associations’ acclaimed by de Tocqueville: 
 
The greater the multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even 
without knowing it, acquire facility in prosecuting great undertakings 
in common. Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association 
(1965, p.108). 
 
Adopting a similar assumption, Coleman (1990) explains the transition from 
social to political as a natural occurrence inherent to the function of social 
capital. That is, voluntary organizations have the capability of carrying out 
non-intended functions against their original purposes, and such changes in 
relations constitute an important part of social capital. 
Support for this assumption can be found in studies that have 
demonstrated a positive link between members in voluntary associations and 
higher levels of political participation (Alford & Scoble, 1968; La Due Lake & 
Huckfeldt, 1998; Milbrath, 1965; Olsen, 1972; Rogers, Bultena, & Barb, 1975;  
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Verba, 1965; Verba & Nie, 1972; Wilkins, 2000). Putnam (1993)’s pioneering 
work exemplified how civic engagement as a social capital asset led to various 
participatory processes for a working democracy. Precisely how and why such 
a connection to non-political organizations stimulates political involvement 
has not, however, been widely recognized as an empirical issue worthy of 
study (Erickson & Nosanchuck, 1990; Levi, 1996; Pollock, 1982). Three 
different mechanisms have been identified to explain how this structural 
dimension of social resources leads to behaviors in the political dimension. 
The simplest explanation draws on the well-established influence of 
socioeconomic status in predicting both political participation (Alford & 
Scoble, 1968; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Olsen, 1972; Verba & Nie, 1972) and 
joining more, staying longer and being relatively more active in voluntary 
organizations (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McPherson, 1981). Because the 
joiner characteristics are commonly predisposed by socioeconomic status, 
those who have more organizational memberships are more likely to take part 
in the political arena as well (Erbe, 1964; Nie et al., 1996; Pollock, 1982; Verba 
& Nie, 1972). Such a dispositional account is however limited in that the link is 
based largely on assumptions. Moreover, many studies have found that the 
effects of voluntary associations on political participation were rather 
independent of the influence of SES (Olsen, 1972; Sallach et al., 1972; Alford 
and Scoble, 1968; Verba and Nie, 1972; Rogers et al., 1975). 
Others insist on looking into the unique parts generated and played by 
actual associational involvement to explain the connection. According to this 
view, it is hard to assume that simply being involved in non-political 
associations assures political activation. More importantly, studies have 
confirmed that, once associated, the SES-related differences are likely to  
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disappear in the face of other factors generated through organizational 
experiences, such as new perspectives toward diversity (Almond & Verba, 
1963; Rogers et al., 1975), participatory traits enhanced through various 
associational works (Almond & Verba, 1963; Pollock, 1982), and civic 
orientations such as a sense of civic duty or faith in democratic institutions 
(Denney, 1979). Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) argued that the 
acquisition and practice of these ‘civic skills’ in non-political voluntary 
associations are less affected by educational attainment. In the same vein, 
Denney (1979) stressed the important role of the “adult resocialization” 
process in shaping civic orientations that takes place in non-political 
organizations. These processes of social mobilization outside of politics are 
very much essential and relevant to political mobilization, for they serve as a 
‘training ground’ through which people can be smoothly and effectively 
transmitted into political activities. 
Lastly, some scholars have emphasized the need for actual political 
stimuli to generate the function of political mobilization within associations. 
Political input was especially necessary for associations in which the political 
potentials are difficult to develop. Rogers et al., (1975) argued that diversity 
seldom arises when most members join through the sponsorship of similar 
friends. Informal interactions with friends or neighbors, according to Olsen 
(1972), showed no effect on voting turnout. Even the experience of holding 
associational office had no effect on political participation, when the specific 
culture or activities of associations do not encourage the willingness to take 
positions of high responsibility (Erickson & Nosanchuck, 1990). 
To those members who are simply not interested in politics or not 
susceptible to indirect mobilization, direct political incentives are critical as  
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well. Pollock (1982) found that political orientation was the key mobilizing 
factor that could translate organizational participation in purely social 
activities into participation in political activities. Exposing members to 
political information is also an important mobilizing input. Fuchs, Minnite, 
and Shapiro (2000) emphasize the role of an explicitly political agenda that 
enables organizational members to “expressly confront contentious and 
interest-based social and political issues” as a key factor leading to political 
participation (p.13). Intra-group political discussion played an important role 
in making a political agenda salient (Verba & Nie, 1972) and providing 
“connections with politics” that otherwise would have been absent (Erickson 
& Nosanchuck, 1990, p.207). Given that organizations or networks are capable 
of acting as ‘vehicles’ for accomplishing certain purposes (R. Hardin, 1999, 
2000), voluntary organizations can even serve as an independent agent of 
political mobilization by providing direct channels of political recruitment 
(Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), transforming 
its members into “parapolitical actors” (Olsen, 1972, p.318). 
Social Trust and Political Participation. The value of social trust as 
social capital has been best known to play the so-called “credit slip” function 
that works against the logic of collective action; trust “lubricates cooperation” 
(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993) or “turns rational fools into effective 
cooperators” (Newton, 1997, p.576). How this trust-based cooperation can 
further grease the wheel of political participation, however, has been 
relatively unexplored (Inglehart, 1999; Levi, 1996). 
A number of scholars have rationalized how the cognitive domain, 
where trust belongs, develops into a specific behavioral pattern. According to 
Luhmann (1979), trust operates as a mechanism that reduces relational  
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complexities, by which individuals can expand their action boundaries. Scholz 
and Lubell (1998) argue that trust works as a heuristic that encourages 
individuals to comply with participatory obligations, especially when the 
relevant information is not sufficient. From a series of experimental studies, 
Yamagishi and his associates have developed the idea that trust serves as a 
springboard, ‘emancipating’ individuals from a secure yet confined world to 
the wider opportunities that lie outside it (M. Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 
1998; T. Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). From an economic point of view, 
Fukuyama (1995) argued that reciprocity-based trust is conducive to 
participation by lowering the transaction costs required for participation. 
On the other hand, for social trust to induce participation under the 
political context, it has been suggested that trust at social levels relies on 
political-level trust, “the belief that the government is operating according to 
one’s normative expectations of how government should function” (A. H. 
Miller, 1974, p.990). Two different domains of trust were significantly 
associated according to the finding by Moy and Scheufele (2000), which 
implies that political trust can be seen as an extension of trust in generalized 
others. And the lack of political trust indicated by disbelief in legitimacy, 
disaffection or alienation was traditionally the very cause of participatory 
withdrawal from political activities (Almond & Verba, 1963; Finifter, 1970). 
According to scholars who support the ‘ethics-based’ or ‘moralistic’ 
view of trust as opposed to reciprocity-based trust, however, social trust is 
entirely incapable of solving collective problems or promoting participatory 
outcomes (Offe, 1999; Uslaner, 1998, 2002). They argue that a faith in 
generalized others’ trustworthiness develops early in life, which tends to 
depend on having an optimistic world view (Uslaner, 1998) or life satisfaction  
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(Shah, 1998). And Scheufele (1999a) found that, regardless of whether trust 
serves as a moral basis or as a motivational factor, it did not have any impact 
on political participation. 
The intervention effect of political trust was controversial, too. 
According to Newton (1999b), political trust is “a thinner kind” than social 
trust is, “belonging to the public political sphere, where there are more 
unknowns, greater risks, and less predictability” (p.179). And because 
politicians or public authorities are often judged by second-hand information, 
such as performance or appearance (M. M. Miller & Reese, 1982; Pfau, Moy, 
Radler, & Bridgeman, 1988), trust in political figures does not necessarily 
correspond with trust in general others, let alone with leaps of faith from the 
social to the political levels (Craig, 1993; Newton, 1999b). Wilkins (2000) also 
found political trust to be contradictory, rather than consistent, with other 
values of social capital. Moreover, political trust or confidence in the political 
system either had no link to political participation or even discouraged it 
(Austin & Pinkelton, 1995; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Moy et al.,2005; Rosenstone & 
Hansen, 1993; Wilkins, 2000). According to these findings, it seems that a 
healthy degree of distrust or mistrust can activate a constructive skepticism or 
“reasonable frustration” (Wilkins, 2000, p.578) and lead to political 
engagement (R. Hardin, 2002; Uslaner, 2002). 
Talk and Political Participation. Whereas trust serves a less pragmatic 
function, as a lubricant working for efficient operation rather than in making 
something happen (Arrow, 1972), the informative role that network-based 
conversations play in enhancing the mobilization process is expected to be 
more straightforward and explicit.  
 
31
According to Kim (2004) and Scheufele (2000), conversations for 
conversation’s sake are capable of a latent yet unique democratic function 
(Kim, 2004; Scheufele, 2000). Given that public-spirited political conversations 
are usually avoided at the expense of social etiquette or group solidarity  
(Eliasoph, 1998, 1999; Mutz & Martin, 2001; Wyatt et al., 2000), the significance 
of politically disengaged social conversation becomes even greater. 
As a social resource, social conversation relates to political mobilization 
in a unique way. Talking with others plays a pivotal role in establishing and 
spreading social norms and ways of cultivating reputations so that people find 
it easier and more reasonable to engage in cooperative behaviors. 
Communication was also as critical as trust was in solving collective action 
problems. For example, letting participants talk to each other functioned to 
confirm the motivation to trust and to increase the willingness to cooperate 
(Gambetta, 1988; Ostrom, 1994; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). Discussion 
in a game-theoretic setting also increased cooperation by developing ‘group 
regardingness,’ a self-interest-narrowing attitude (Van de Kragt, Dawes, 
Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986). The experimental study by Green and Brock 
(1998) also supported this mechanism. They found that communication about 
the benefits of social activities increased the willingness of the low-trust 
individuals to participate in socially constructive activities. In sum, social 
conversation, despite its apparent deficiency in terms of political relevance, 
has the potential to facilitate political action by way of “trust building.” 
Interpersonal discussion of political issues, on the other hand, has been 
the leading factor in promoting various types of political participation, by 
triggering political interest or providing political information, either 
independently or by complementing mass media  (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000;  
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Knoke, 1990; McLeod et al., 1999; McLeod, Scheufele, Moy et al., 1999; 
Scheufele, 2000). Political talk was also found to be an effective social resource 
utilized for political mobilization. Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) argue that 
politically relevant social capital can be realized as political participation by 
the frequency, the level of expertise, and the size of the political 
communication network. And this political reservoir created by political 
communication was the only significant factor that could mobilize participants 
in non-political associations (Erickson & Nosanchuck, 1990). In addition, 
studies have found that the diversity or heterogeneity of networks of political 
discussion impacts the extent to which individuals in non-political settings are 
mobilized for political engagement (Ikeda, 2002; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 
1998; Jack M McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, 1999a; Scheufele et al., 2004). 
Tolerance and Political Participation. As discussed earlier, whether 
tolerance is in a symbiotic relationship with other values of social capital or 
not remains to be determined. Likewise, the outlook on tolerance as an agent 
for political mobilization has been open to much doubt. 
Most of all, opinions are divided as to which—political tolerance or 
intolerance—is more natural or likelier to occur. Some have argued that 
political disagreements with respect to generating political intolerance are 
either not very salient (Mutz, 2002a) or even taboo (Eliasoph, 1998) under 
social settings. 
 
Because politics is such a small part of people’s day-to-day lives, when 
they come into contact with people of opposing views, it is relatively 
easy for them to ignore this dimension of difference or to discover it 
late enough that a friendship of some kind has already been initiated or 
established. Political views need not be at the forefront of daily life or 
daily conversation to produce beneficial consequences (Mutz, 2002a, 
p.122).  
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Although political disagreements might not be the most unsettled issue 
under social interaction settings, others argue that they do prevail because it is 
more natural and easier to harbor stereotypes or prejudices about those 
differences (Devine, 1989; McClosky & Brill, 1983). 
On the positive side, political tolerance is well received as an integral 
condition for a thriving democracy (see Sullivan et al., 1982). As far as 
democratic participation is concerned, it mostly matters for its relevance to 
freedom of political expression and action. Gibson (1992) argued that 
intolerance not only suppresses others’ freedom to express their views and act 
on them but it also affects one’s own freedom and efficacy. In a political 
context, where “heterogeneous worldviews and antagonistic partisans 
prevail,” Ikeda (2002) also emphasized tolerance as the key in encouraging 
citizens to continue being democratic joiners. 
The cognitive mechanism of tolerance in processing different and 
oppositional information explains how the more tolerant are also more likely 
to be political participants. That is, political elites or the highly educated, who 
are traditionally the most active participants in political activities, are also 
more likely to tolerate and support civil liberties by having a “‘sober second 
thought about restricting the rights of those one finds disagreeable” (Bobo & 
Licari, 1989, p.299) or stronger internalized democratic norms as standing 
decisions (Marcus et al., 1995). 
By contrast, Mutz (2002a) casts doubt on the mobilizing role of 
tolerance, because it is about “formalized ways in which people agree to 
disagree” and about “restraint and not doing, rather than political action” 
(p.123). Moreover, a number of studies have called attention to the possible 
incapacity of key antecedents to tolerance to function as catalysts for political  
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mobilization. For example, political discussion and increased exposure to 
diverse viewpoints may not contribute to political participation as much as is 
generally claimed. According to Schudson (1997), conversation at large can 
never be politically of use. Because democracy occurs at inherently public and 
deeply uncomfortable settings, he argues, it requires a peculiar type of talk 
that tends to be rule-governed and oriented toward problem-solving. Political 
discussion in heterogeneous networks does not always warrant the mobilizing 
effect of diversity, either. Cross-cutting exposure to conflicting viewpoints was 
found even to discourage political participation by causing attitudinal 
ambivalence intrapersonally, and social discomforts interpersonally (Mutz, 
2002a, 2002b). Similarly, people tend to take political disagreement personally 
(Eliasoph, 1998) or they feel fear or embarrassment when exposed to different 
opinions (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). As a result, although people do participate 
in political discussions and learn how to cope with diversity and to tolerate 
differences, their choices are likely to be confined to either avoiding politics or 
keeping silent, working against the soul of democracy. 
And the relevance of education with respect to tolerance was also 
criticized as artifactual or superficial, at best, in that tolerance among highly 
educated segments is expressed mostly in defense of their privileged status 
(Sullivan et al., 1979). Therefore, when it comes to a specific policy of 
integration, instead of abstract principles or norm, those who are highly 
educated were not much supportive of it (M. R. Jackman, 1978). According to 
this, it is highly unlikely that tolerance learned through formal education will 
mobilize people to enter the political arena. 
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Moderating Effect of Social Resources on Political Participation 
In understanding the productive aspect of social resources, it is 
important to note what Coleman (1988) described as the “second stage” in 
unpacking the concept of social capital: 
 
The concept of social capital allows taking such resources and showing 
the way they can be combined with other resources to produce 
different system-level behavior or, in other cases, different outcomes for 
individuals (p. S101). 
 
To apply this aspect of the concept to the process through which social 
resources are utilized for political participation, two points are noteworthy. 
First, note the emphasis on the process of making use of resources, i.e., 
being capitalized by individuals. In general, social capital has been treated as 
an aggregated societal level phenomenon (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; 
Norris, 2002b), with empirical focus on the connections between social 
resources and collective outcomes, such as economic development 
(Fukuyama, 1995), market performance (Knack & Keefer, 1997) or government 
performance (Putnam, 1993). However, another important utility of the social 
capital concept should be to account for the outcomes at the level of individual 
actors beyond the structural functions (Coleman, 1988). Thus, social capital 
should be approached as “an ability of [the] actor” to secure benefits by virtue 
of social structures (Portes, 1998) that vary by individuals (Foley & Edwards, 
1997). Brehm and Rahn (1997) also emphasized the importance of locating the 
basis of social capital in “individual behavior, attitudes, and predispositions” 
in order to account for its production (pp.1000-1001).  
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The other point is that one important utility of social resources lies in 
their relative efficiency or in their capacity to replace other types of resources. 
The functional definition of social capital highlights its capability of making 
certain things possible that otherwise cannot be done or can be accomplished 
only at higher costs (Coleman, 1988, 1990). Hardin (2003) also notes that social 
capital can even “displace what might be considered another form of capital 
that is putatively less effective or efficient” (p.2). In sum, the working of social 
resources can also be found in their interactions with other resources in 
facilitating certain outcomes, in which individual actors are actively involved 
for the use of the resources. 
A study by Teachman, Paasch, and Carver (1997) specifically shed light 
on how research on social resources can empirically identify and assess this 
aspect of social capital at the level of the individual. In the replication of 
Coleman’s original study on children’s schooling, they claimed that social 
capital could operate either to enhance or to dilute the effects of the other 
resources, because it represented a “filter through which [other capital] is 
transmitted to and used by [individuals]” (p.1345). In order to find out how 
social capital sets this context in working for conversion, they argued, testing 
the moderating effects of the social resources was essential. Wilson and 
Musick (1998) recognized the lack of this analytical procedure in social capital 
research and argued that testing social capital “demands an interaction term” 
(p.801). 
Given the significance of focusing on the parts played by individuals in 
utilizing social resources and the explanatory potential of examining the 
moderating effects of social resources, the combined effect of social resources  
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with resources at the individual level is expected to add new meaning to the 
utility of social resources and to the outcome of political participation as well. 
 
Social Resources and Education 
Formal education has been the most important investment in human 
capital that yields knowledge, skills or higher income (Becker, 1964). By 
providing individuals with the civic and political capacity, education has been 
consistently a strong predictor of individual political participation (Alford & 
Scoble, 1968; Downs, 1957; Olsen, 1972; Verba et al.,1995). Despite the 
enhanced level of education, however, the level of political participation has 
not increased accordingly (Brady et al., 1995; Patterson, 2002). And this has 
necessitated looking at the role of formal education in political mobilization so 
as to include other factors beyond those that operate at the individual level 
(Nie et al., 1996; Scheufele, 1999a). 
Amplification. The relationship between education and social 
resources on the pathway to political participation is broken down into two 
distinct patterns. The first pattern is captured in what Wilson and Musick 
(1998) have labeled as an “amplification” argument. According to them, social 
resources “make an additional resource to those supplied by individual 
resources alone,” access to which further reinforces the impact of human 
capital (p.801). Studies have supported this view with findings that people 
with more education were also more likely to have higher social resources. 
They were found to have easier access to such resources by being in better 
position in social networks or by being exposed more often to people who are 
already resource-rich both socially and politically (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & 
Levine, 1995; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Lin, 2001b; Nie et al., 1996;  
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Verba & Nie, 1972; Wilkins, 2000). Education was also linked to the 
affordability of dealing with possible losses of investments in social capital. 
Those who were in better off overall in terms of social and financial security 
were less likely to be affected by or were less concerned about, for example, 
betrayed trust (Inglehart, 1999; Uslaner, 2002). After all, social capital serves to 
“enhance human capital on the cheap” (La due lake, 1998, p.581). 
Therefore, when the effect of political mobilization was assessed with 
the joint effect of social resources and accessibility to such resources, Rogers et 
al. (1975) found that social resources in the form of formal associations 
“further solidified the interests of high-status groups” (p.317). Based on the 
finding that social capital has a stronger effect on volunteering among people 
with higher human capital, Wilson and Musick (1998) concluded that 
“without the individual resources to exploit it, social capital will lie idle; 
unless human capital is combined with social capital its investment potential 
is reduced” (p.812). 
Substitution. By contrast, others see the relationship between social 
resources and individual resources as functionally substituting for each 
other’s contribution to political mobilization. Based on this view, affluence in 
one dimension is more likely to suppress the need for another resource and, 
conversely, the lack of a certain resource will boost the utility of other 
available resources. Therefore, the significance of social resources also exists in 
its distinctive role of complementing the lack of human capital, instead of in 
strengthening the richness of human capital. There are several reasons that 
make this view convincing. For example, the distribution of social resources to 
a large degree depends on individuals’ “socializing or relational disposition,” 
which is often independent of educational level (Bourdieu, 1983). Moreover,  
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Nie et al. (1996) and Verba et al. (1995) found that, once conditioned by social 
structure, the positional or educational differences tended to diminish, if not 
disappear. In addition, according to DeFilippis (2001), social capital represents 
a highly “power-laden connection,” in which individual resources can be at 
odds with social resources so that high levels of individual resources are better 
produced or protected by class-based isolation, not by connectedness. Social 
resources, he argues, are “for the poor and therefore on the losing end of a set 
of power relations” (p.790).  
Accordingly, studies have shown the possibility of substitution by 
social resources that can further overcome the lack of human capital. For 
example, Verba and Nie (1972) found that involvement in associations 
mobilized people at the lowest status levels more than those who are high in 
human capital. Although Teachman et al. (1997) failed to find a significant 
interaction effect of parental education and social capital on schooling, this 
result indirectly suggested that social capital might significantly work for the 
lower level of education, which could not be specified due to limitations in the 
data set. 
 
Social Resources and Mass Media Use  
According to the gratification theory of mass media effects, individuals 
use mass media with the specific intention of fulfilling different needs such as 
information, identification, integration or entertainment (see Katz & Blumler, 
1973; McQuail, 1987). The act of using specific media, therefore, may well be 
considered an investment at the individual level for a gain in gratifying 
resources.  
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Media-based, Cognitive vs. Social Resource Approach. Prior to 
considering social resources within the link between media use and political 
participation, the relationship has been traditionally understood so that 
media’s inherent characteristics as expressed in the format of presentation and 
in the content of the message directly influence participation. In particular, 
how well each medium serves as an informational source was considered a 
key factor in determining the extent to which individuals are politically 
engaged (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Lemert, 1984). Numerous studies have 
confirmed that reading newspapers plays an essentially informative and, 
subsequently, a mobilizing role, whereas television watching is fundamentally 
non-informative or even detrimental to informed engagement in politics 
(Findahl & Hoijer, 1981; McLeod, Daily, Guo et al., 1996; McLeod et al., 1999; J. 
P. Robinson & Davis, 1990). Viewing public affairs or news content on 
television, on the other hand, has shown mixed effects depending on the 
pervasiveness of the form of television vs. the news content (Findahl & Hoijer, 
1981; Newton, 1999a; Norris, 1996; Patterson & McClure, 1976; Petty, 1988; J. P. 
Robinson & Davis, 1990; J. P. Robinson & Levi, 1986; Weber & Fleming, 1983). 
In addition, information gain from media use has been found to 
significantly depend on human capital factors, i.e., education- or income-
based status, which in turn influences the accessibility or the availability of the 
media as an information source. Based on this perspective, certain types of 
media tend to favor certain socioeconomic groups, causing unequal 
information gain from media use (see Gaziano, 1983, 1997; Viswanath & 
Finnegan, 1996). Newspapers, on the one hand, work better for those in the 
higher socioeconomic bracket through greater exposure to them and more 
relevance to their interests due to media characters or unique managerial  
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systems (Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1986; Tichenor et al., 1970). Television, 
on the other hand, tends to serve as an effective informational source for the 
less educated due to its lower-class bias (Kleinnijenhuis, 1991; Kwak, 1999; 
McLeod, Bybee, & Durall, 1979; Newman, 1976). Others, on the contrary, 
found that this lower-class bias failed to increase knowledge among the less 
educated (Gandy & Waylly, 1985; Horstmann, 1991; Lee, 2000; McLeod & 
Perse, 1994). 
The explanation in terms of interaction between media use and human 
capital factors is still restricted to media characteristics, in that it accounts for 
the socioeconomic determinants of the mass-mediated resources. More recent 
studies have proposed that the effect of mass media use on political 
participation should alternatively consider the impact of other politically 
relevant social resources, access to which are influenced by different types of 
media use. To understand under what conditions participation is promoted or 
constrained, Wilkins (2000) argued that it is necessary to reveal how media 
use influences the degree of “access to social resources”(p.569). Kang and 
Kwak (2003) also suggested that mass-mediated messages are differently 
processed depending on the “residential resources” that provide different 
contexts for people’s connections with their communities and this in turn 
impacts their level of political involvement. 
Incorporating social and relational aspects into this link is not entirely 
new. A number of studies of political communication have explored the 
moderating or mediating roles played by social or institutional trust  (Moy & 
Scheufele, 2000; Moy et al., 2005; Schulz, 2001; Shah, 1998), political 
conversation (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; McLeod et al., 1999; McLeod, 
Scheufele, Moy et al., 1999; Scheufele, 2000, 2002) or civic engagement (Stolle  
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& Rochon, 1998) in conjunction with media use and various participatory 
behaviors. Without explicit credits to social resources, however, these studies 
seemed irrelevant to each other and, more importantly, how the distribution 
of or access to these additional resources is determined differently by various 
types of media use was of secondary interest. 
Newspapers and Social Resource. Since Alexis de Tocqueville claimed 
the essential role of newspapers in building democratic associations (1965), 
newspapers have been associated with high levels of various social capital 
assets (Putnam, 1995b, 1996, December, 2000). On the one hand, newspaper 
reading is conducive to the generation of social resources. Schudson (1997) 
emphasizes that newspaper reading plays a key role in providing a 
conversational basis for politics. Newspaper reading also serves as a 
fundamental source of collective norms by transmitting social expectations 
and introducing references about being “good citizens” (Knack & Kropf, 1998, 
pp.594-595). On the other hand, newspaper reading enhances the transmission 
of social resources into political resources or, in reverse, social resources help 
general news messages transmitted into mobilizing information. For example, 
the effect of the cooperative norm on voting was greater among those who 
read newspapers more often (Knack & Kropf, 1998). And interpersonal 
discussions of politics helped people understand news better and in turn 
participate more actively (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele, 2000, 2002). In 
sum, the joint effect of reading newspapers more frequently and possessing 
higher levels of social resources is expected to increase the willingness to 
participate in politics. 
Television and Social Resource. Television, in contrast, has been 
known to reduce overall social capacity (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b, 1996,  
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December, 2000). Time spent watching television was negatively associated 
with various aspects of social capital (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Moy et al., 1999; 
Norris, 1996; Scheufele & Shah, 2000). Although some claimed that the 
‘content’ of television watching should be disaggregated (Moy et al., 1999; 
Newton, 1999a; Norris, 1996; Shah, 1998; Wilkins, 2000), television news was 
often the main target of blame for social and political alienation (M. J. 
Robinson, 1976). 
As to how television, regardless of what people watch, erodes social 
resources and inevitably fails to mobilize its viewers, two explanations have 
been offered. First, time spent watching television is simply incompatible, or 
in competition, with investment in social resources. According to Putnam 
(1995a), television watching comes at the cost of social activities by 
“privatizing or individualizing” leisure time, disrupting opportunities for 
social capital formation or rendering experience with one’s community “wider 
and shallower” (p.75). This is partly based on Meyrowitz (1985)’s earlier 
reasoning that television viewers choose private over public activities because 
television blurs the division between private and public. Green and Brock 
(1998) more recently offer an alternative explanation that television watching 
has a direct impact on reducing the need for interaction or belongingness 
because it provides viewers with “parasocial” or “ersatz” social capital. Based 
on an experimental study, they found some psychological and situational 
determinants that influenced the choice of ersatz social activities over real 
social activities; people who trust others less, especially when the cost of real 
social activities was salient, tended to withdraw from real social activities and 
settle on the ersatz world.  
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The worldview that television produces is another reason heavy 
viewers are more likely to be discouraged from investing for social resources 
and participating politically. Primarily based on the cultivation theory of 
television effects (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980), Putnam 
(1995a; 1995b) pointed out that television watching cultivates beliefs about a 
‘misanthropic and mean’ world, which makes its heavy viewers less trusting. 
Television also fosters a personal and individual worldview by locating 
individuals at the center in creating and resolving conflicts (McBride, 1998) or 
by holding individuals accountable for societal problems (Iyengar, 1991). As a 
result, heavy viewers tend to remain individually alienated from social or 
political matters with a belief that they “are best left in the hands of 
authorities” (Morgan & Shanahan, 1991, p.101). 
When these mechanisms were tested, however, neither the time 
restraint nor television’s negative portrayals accounted for social capital 
(Hooghe, 2002; Moy et al., 1999; Uslaner, 1998). Instead, the relationship 
seemed dependent on other factors; dispositional variables, such as confidence 
or leadership, and affective variables, such as optimism, were found to be 
more directly relevant than television use was in the production and 
destruction of social capital (Scheufele & Shah, 2000; Uslaner, 1998). The 
finding from a study by Kang and Kwak (2003), however, suggests that theses 
mechanisms are not only plausible but also capable of accounting for the 
distinctive relationships that were created across television use, social 
resources and political participation. Upon examining the effect of the 
contextual and psychological aspects of social resources, they found that the 
length and stability of community residency moderated the negative 
relationship between television use and participation. In addition, they  
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applied two mechanisms to explain the different interaction patterns. For 
example, the positive interaction term between television news use and 
residential stability was interpreted as showing that television’s negative 
effect was greater with those who live in less stable neighborhoods, which 
supports the work of the ‘mean world’ effect. On the other hand, the negative 
interaction term between time spent watching television and the length of 
residence was interpreted as indicating the effect of ‘time displacement’; 
increases in time spent watching television indeed reduced the participation 
level and this effect was greater among those who had lived longer in a 
community.  
In sum, it is difficult to overcome the detrimental effect of television use 
on political participation as long as media-based images about the world are 
not counterbalanced in reality or social interests or social capacity is 
repeatedly replaced by individual satisfaction.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
As outlined so far, the social resource model of political participation is 
fundamentally based on the concept of social capital and its politicizing 
function. The potential of social capital to account for political involvement at 
the individual level has not, however, been systematically examined, nor have 
the contradictions been properly challenged. To assess the viability of the 
social resource model for political participation, I developed research 
questions regarding three essential areas of interest, presented here in order. 
The first set of research questions deals with the basic understanding of 
the concept of social capital and, in particular, its dimensionality and 
interrelational structures. It might have been noticed that to this point in the 
discussion social capital remains a ‘hypothetical’ concept which is not directly 
measured but rather consists of several measurable resource variables in 
different dimensions—associational membership, social trust, social/political 
talk, and tolerance. As noted earlier, however, these social resources may not 
be equally distributed across different individual resources, such as 
demographics or different mass media use patterns. For this reason, it might 
not be straightforwardly tied together into a coherent concept, as has been 
claimed. Thus, it will be important to examine the degree to which these 
components serve as meaningful indicators of social resources, as in the 
following questions. 
 
R.Q. 1-1. Is social capital manifested as a coherent concept by different 
forms of social resources? To what extent are various forms of social  
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resources differently related to individual resources and, at the same 
time, related to each other as common indicators of social capital? 
 
To approach this question, I will adopt a structural equation modeling 
technique using the LISREL, which permits the examination of any 
hypothetical concept by treating it as a ‘latent variable.’ Such a latent variable 
is assumed to be a common factor that influences different sets of indicators in 
a measurement model. At the same time, it allows estimating the extent to 
which the latent variable is related to other variables by specifying them in a 
structural model (Bollen, 1989). Therefore, not only the relevance of each 
indicator to the common concept of social capital but also the relation of social 
capital to demographics or media use variables will be examined 
simultaneously. 
The next question is about the inner structure of relations among the 
resources identified. As discussed earlier, empirical analyses have centered 
around the structural dimension because voluntary association was the focus 
of the well-known ‘virtuous circle’ thesis of social capital (Putnam, 1993). 
Nevertheless, results indicating the extent to which social trust, talk, or 
tolerance is network-based have been either inconclusive or inadequate to 
establish a causal relationship. In addition, findings from Stolle and Rochon 
(1998) suggest a particularly important point in examining the role of formal 
membership. That is, the interrelationship between the structural dimension 
and the values dimension of social capital should take the diversity and the 
purpose of the group into account. Therefore, the relationship between the 
structural dimension and various forms of social relational values will be 
explored as follows.  
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R.Q. 1-2. Are social trust, talk, and tolerance membership-based? And 
to what degree do the effects of formal membership differ by types of 
association?  
 
To examine this, each relational value will be predicted by formal 
associational membership using a hierarchical regression analysis. In addition, 
it will be examined whether this membership effect is manifested through 
multiple memberships, in contrast to the case of non-members, or whether 
types of membership influence the creation of each value. 
Building upon the explication of the dimensionality and inner structure 
of the concept of social capital, the second set of research questions examines 
how these social capital assets functionally relate to political participation. 
With respect to the political relevance of the outcome, several modifications in 
the model are needed.  
First, scholars have found that the psychological aspect of involvement 
was a key motivational factor in the decision to engage in political 
participation (Brady et al., 1995; Knack & Kropf, 1998; Verba & Nie, 1972) and 
that it should precede other socially interested behavior (Knack & Kropf, 
1998). Moreover, when the level of political interest is controlled, the overall 
confidence of the significant relationships tends to increase because the 
accountability of political interest is likely to “attenuate the strength of other 
relationships in the models” in explaining political participation (Scheufele, 
2002, p.62). Therefore, considerable effort will be made to reveal the 
mechanisms through which these social resources are utilized to account for  
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why people do or do not become politically involved, beyond demographics, 
political interests and mass media use. 
R. Q. 2-1. How do associational membership, social trust, talking with 
others and tolerance facilitate political participation beyond 
demographics, political interest and mass media use? 
 
Second, since relational values are inherently apolitical, i.e., social, how 
these non-political factors generate politically behavioral outcomes can be 
intervened by several factors that buffer the gap. Though it is somewhat 
disputable, earlier discussion has observed that political trust could mediate 
between social trust and political participation. In terms of the effect of talking 
with others, political talk was more likely to be related to an enhancement of 
political information, while socializing talking was more effective in trust 
building. Thus, including political knowledge will shed significant light on the 
ways that informational values of social relations contribute to political 
participation. In order to better understand how social factors are transformed 
into politically useful resources, therefore, political mobilization mechanisms 
will be further elaborated, taking political trust and political knowledge into 
consideration as follows. 
 
R. Q. 2-2. How is political trust related to social resources in affecting 
political participation? 
 
R. Q. 2-3. How is political knowledge related to social resources in 
affecting political participation? 
  
 
50
To estimate these relationships, I will again use the structural equation 
modeling technique. By alternating between ‘freeing’ or ‘fixing’ links among 
the different forms of social resources or between social resources and 
intervening variables, the structural modeling technique will allow estimating 
whether and how these variables are related to each other on the pathways to 
political participation. Ultimately, this will result in a causal model with a best 
fit. Both the direct and indirect influences involving the intervening variables 
will also be tested in the course of modeling political participation that best 
fits the data. 
The last set of research questions will go beyond these linear effects to 
focus on whether and how social resources moderate relationships between 
individual resources and political participation. As noted earlier, two 
individual-level resources—education and media use—have been of special 
interest, each of which was meaningfully combined with social resources in 
accounting for political participation. With respect to the interplay between 
social resources and education, two possible interaction patterns will be 
examined, as follows. 
 
R. Q. 3-1. How do social resources interact with formal education in 
influencing political participation? Do they reinforce education’s 
positive impact on political participation, or do they rather complement 
the negative impact of the lack of human capital on political 
participation? Which among the different forms of social resources 
contributes to which interaction pattern most significantly? 
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Mass media’s inherent characteristics have typified the positive role of 
newspaper reading and the negative effect of watching television on political 
participation. More importantly, different types of media use have been found 
to influence access to other politically relevant social resources. Thus 
examining how the effects of newspaper and television use are combined with 
social resources is expected to add new meaning to well-established 
relationships between media use and political participation. Interactions 
between mass media use and social resources will be tested as follows. 
 
R. Q. 3-2. How do social resources interact with newspaper use on 
political participation? Is the generally positive mobilizing role of 
newspaper reading further reinforced or mitigated by the effect of 
social resources? 
 
R. Q. 3-3. How do social resources interact with television use with 
respect to political participation? Is the generally negative mobilizing 
role of television watching further reinforced or mitigated by the effect 
of social resources? 
 
To test these moderating effects, multiplicative terms between 
individual resources and social resources will be constructed and tested in 
regression analyses. To better grasp how some of the significant interactions 
account for their effects on political participation, the effects will be further 
plotted.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODS 
 
Data Sets 
To analyze the relationships previously outlined in the research 
questions, I will utilize three data sets. As discussed so far, key tasks involved 
in building the social resource model of political participation are evaluating 
the rationale for tying several variables, which otherwise would have been 
examined separately, together into a coherent concept and then applying the 
concept in accounting for political participation. The primary issue concerning 
the variables lies, then, with determining how well they are conceptually and 
functionally related to each other, while ascertaining how accurately they are 
measuring certain indicators of the concept is secondary. I therefore chose 
existing data sets that already include an extensive range of measures. 
To be suitable for use in analyses testing the social resource model of 
political participation, a data set should meet several conditions. Most 
necessarily, it should include both the structural and value dimensions of 
social resources, because resources not only are used independently but the 
interrelationships among different forms of resources are of special interest. 
And, rather ideally, the structure of social resources should be specific enough 
to estimate the differential effect of organizational type on the value-
generation function and on political participation, as noted in many studies. 
The data from the Social Capital Benchmark Study (2000) satisfy all of 
these conditions best, as far as the purely social resources are concerned. To 
examine the effects of more politically relevant social capital, the National 
Election Study (2004) is more suitable because it includes all the variables plus 
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a political talk measure instead of one for social talk. The measure of the 
structure of social resources is, however, too simple so it does not allow for 
specifying organizational type. To complement this, I will also include the 
American Citizen Participation Study (1990), which has a more elaborated 
measure of associational membership and tolerance. 
In all three data sets, the variables used for the analyses are grouped 
into six parts with causal orders. (1) Demographic variables are included as 
controls. (2) For psychological involvement in political participation, political 
interest is controlled after demographics. (3) And, media use variables—they 
not only directly influence the distribution of social resources and the 
willingness to opt for political participation, but also interact with social 
resources—are included as an informational resource at the individual level. 
(4) After demographics, political interest, and media use variables, social 
resource variables are included, the dimensions of which are specified as 
structure vs. values. (5) To elaborate the link between social resources and 
political behaviors, two intervening variables are included: political trust and 
political knowledge. (6) And, finally, political participation is the dependent 
variable as an outcome of social resources. These sets of variables were 
measured in each data set as follows. 
 
Social Capital Benchmark Survey 
The first data came from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 
conducted by the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University (Social capital benchmark survey, 2000, 2001). 
The study was specifically designed to provide systematic measurements and 
a rich database for studies of social capital at both the community and national  
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levels. A national sample of 3,003 respondents was collected from July to 
November 2000, conducting telephone surveys using random-digit-dialing 
(RDD) techniques by TNS Intersearch, a commissioned survey firm. 
For demographic controls, four variables were included. The mean of 
respondents’ age was 44.4 years old with standard deviation of 16.3. The 
gender ratio of respondents was 48 percent male vs. 52 percent female. The 
level of formal education was measured on a 7-point scale of school years 
completed, ranging from “less than high school” to “graduate or professional 
degree.” On average, respondents reported they had “attended some college” 
(m = 3.42). Household income was assessed on a non-linear 8-point scale 
ranging from “less than $20,000” to “more than $100,000” with varying 
increments. Both the mode and median of household income fell between 
$30,000 and $49,000. 
As a motivational control, interest in politics and national affairs was 
measured on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all interested” to “very 
interested” (m = 2.83, s.d. =1.00). 
For informational control at the individual level, two media use 
variables were included. Newspaper use was measured by number of days in 
the past week reading a daily newspaper (m = 3.34, s.d. = 2.99), and television 
use was measured by number of hours per day spent watching television on 
an average weekday (m = 3.04, s.d. = 2.69). 
Measures of social resources were divided into two dimensions. The 
structural dimension of social resources was measured by the number of  
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formal memberships that respondents had in the last 12 months among the 18 
groups presented (m = 2.99, s.d. =2.70,  = .71).3 
The value dimension of social resources included three variables. Social 
trust was measured by asking “whether most people can be trusted or you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people, or it depends” (m = 2.01, s.d. = .96). 
Social talk was constructed by a seven-point scale measuring the frequency of 
talking with immediate neighbors from “never” to “just about every day” (m 
= 5.06, s.d. = 1.83). And tolerance was measured on a five-point scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” with the statement, “a book that 
most people disapprove should be kept out of my local library” (m = 3.78, s.d.  
= 1.50). 
In addition, two intervening variables were included. Political trust was 
measured as an additive index of two trust items in “national and local 
governments do what is right” ( = .67). And political knowledge was 
measured by asking respondents whether they can name two of the U.S. 
Senators of their respective states, on a five-point scale ranging from “failed to 
name either” to “both correct” (m = 2.23, s.d. = 1.59). 
As a dependent variable, political participation was an additive index 
of three items measuring political activities in the past 12 months, including 
                                                 
3 The 18 groups presented were (1) adults sports club, league, or 
outdoor activity club, (2) youth organization, (3) parent association or other 
school support, (4) veterans group, (5) neighborhood association, (6) clubs or 
organizations for senior citizens or older people, (7) charity or social welfare 
organization, (8) labor union, (9) professional, trade, farm or business 
association, (10) service clubs or fraternal organizations, (11) ethnic, 
nationality, or civil rights organizations, (12) public interest groups, (13) 
political action groups, political clubs, party committees, (14) literary, art, 
discussion, music, dancing etc, (15) hobby, investment, garden clubs, (16) 
support groups or self-help program, (17) over the Internet, and (18) any other. 
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“signing a petition, attending a political meeting or rally, or participating in 
any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches” ( = .48). 
 
National Election Study 
The second data set came from the 2004 National Election Study that 
examined extensive aspects of political beliefs and actions (Burns & Kinder, 
2004). Data collection was conducted by face-to-face interviews at two time 
points, a pre-election interview (September 7 ~ November 1, 2004) and a post-
election re-interview (November 3 ~ December 20, 2004). Out of a sample of 
1,833 eligible respondents, the pre-election interview yielded 1,212 cases (66.1 
percent of response rate), and 1,066 among the 1,212 went on for the post-
election interview (88.1 percent of the re-interview rate). 
Four variables were included as demographic controls: respondent’s 
age (m = 47.3, s.d. = 17.1), gender (53 percent female), education4 (m = 4.3, 
“attended some college”), and household income5 (mean = 14.9, “$30,000-
34,999,” median = 16, “45,000-49,999”). 
Political interest was measured on a three-point scale asking whether 
respondents were “very much, somewhat or not much interested” in political 
campaigns in an election year (m = 2.26, s.d. = .71). 
For the media use measure, two news use variables were included. 
Newspaper use was measured by number of days reading a daily newspaper 
(m = 3.08, s.d. = 2.38). Television news use was an additive index of number of 
                                                 
4 Education was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from “less 
than 9 grades” to “advanced degree.” 
5 Household income was measured using 23 categories from “less than 
$2,999” to “$120,000 and over.”  
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days watching national network news and local TV news shows at two 
different times ( = .69). 
The structural dimension of social resources was measured by number 
of organizations that respondents were a member of (m = .89, s.d. = 1.45).6 
Social trust was measured by a dichotomous trust item asking, “Would 
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”(m = 1.44, s.d. = .50). Political talk was measured by 
number of days in a week respondents discussed politics with family or 
friends (m = 2.66, s.d. = 2.55). The tolerance measure was a combination of 
three items asking opinions about discriminating against homosexuals ( 
= .64).7 
A measure of political trust used four items of trust in government or 
politicians ( = .60). 8 Political knowledge was an additive index of four 
                                                 
6 Instead of presenting specific organizations with respect to each of 
which respondents give an answer, exemplary organizations were introduced. 
The exact wording was: “There is a list of some organizations people can 
belong to: There are labor unions, associations of people who do the same 
kinds of work, fraternal groups such as Lions or Kiwanis, hobby clubs or 
sports teams, groups working on political issues, community groups, and 
school groups. Not counting membership in a local church or synagogue, are 
you a member of any of these kinds of organizations?” 
7 (1) Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job 
discrimination? (2) Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in 
the United States Armed Forces or don't you think so? (3) Do you think gay or 
lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally 
permitted to adopt children? 
8 (1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government 
in Washington to do what is right? (2) Would you say the government is 
pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is 
run for the benefit of all the people? (3) To what extent does the government 
waste tax revenue? (4) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the 
government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of 
them are crooked?  
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dichotomous items measuring whether respondents correctly recognize the 
job or office holding of four political figures ( = .66).9 
As a dependent variable, political participation was constructed by ten 
participation items asking about respondents’ participation in various political 
activities ( = .70). 10 
 
American Citizen Participation Study 
The third data set came from the American Citizen Participation Study 
conducted in 1990 by the National Opinion Research Center (Verba, 
Schlozman, Brady, & Nie, 1995). The in-person interviews were carried out to 
                                                 
9 The exact wording was: “Now we have a set of questions concerning 
various public figures. We want to see how much information about them gets 
out to the public from television, newspapers and the like. What job or 
political office does (1) Dennis Hastert, (2) Dick Cheney, (3) Tony Blair, (4) 
William Rehnquist now hold?” 
10 Seven of them measured campaign activities: “We would like to find 
out about some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an 
election. (1) During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show 
them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates? (2) 
Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like 
that in support of a particular candidate? (3) Did you wear a campaign button, 
put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front 
of your house? (4) Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or 
candidates? (5) During an election year people are often asked to make a 
contribution to support campaigns. Did you give money to an individual 
candidate running for public office? (6) Did you give money to a political 
party during this election year? (7) Did you give any money to any other 
group that supported or opposed candidates?” And three items measured 
expressive participation: “Over the past five years or so, have you done any of 
the following things to express your views about something the government 
should or should not be doing? (1) Contacted a politician or government 
official either in person, or in writing, or some other way? (2) Taken part in a 
protest, march or demonstration? (3) Worked together with people who 
shared the same concern? 
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examine political and nonpolitical civic participation of a subset of 2,517 
respondents. 
Four demographics are identified: age (m = 51.44, s.d. = 15.82), gender 
(53.1 percent female), education (m = 13.3, “12th grade of school years 
completed”), and household income (m = 7.18, median = 7, “$30,000-
34,999”).11 
Political interest was measured by asking about respondents’ level of 
interest in politics and public affairs at both the local and national level ( 
= .73). 
Newspaper use was a combination of three measures of frequency of 
newspaper reading and attention to national and local politics or public affairs 
( = .76). And television news use as measured by two seven-point scale 
measures of frequency of watching national news and public affairs programs 
on television ( = .64). 
Associational membership was measured by the number of formal 
memberships (m = 2.14, s.d. = 2.25).12 A measure of political talk used two 
items measuring the frequency of talking with others about politics or affairs 
at the local and the national levels ( = .75). And tolerance was measured by 
                                                 
11 Household income was measured on a sixteen-point scale ranging 
from “under $2,000” to “$200,000 and over.” 
12 Respondents were presented with 20 organization types that they 
could identify in reporting their memberships: “(1) service clubs or fraternal 
(2) veterans (3) religious (4) nationality, ethnic, or racial (5) the elderly or 
seniors (6) women’s rights (7) labor union (8) business or professional (9) 
political issues (10) non-partisan or civic (11) general liberal or conservative 
(12) elections (13) youth (14) literary or art (15) hobby or sports (16) 
neighborhood (17) health service (18) education (19) cultural and (20) other.”  
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combining four dichotomous items tapping tolerance toward homosexuals, 
racists, militarists or atheists ( = .72).13   
The measure of political participation as a dependent variable was an 
additive index of five items measuring political contact with governmental 
officials and participation in protest, march or demonstration regarding 
political issues ( = .68). 14 
 
                                                 
13 The exact wording was: “There are always some people whose ideas 
are considered bad or dangerous by other people. (1) If someone in your 
community suggested that a book he or she wrote in favor of homosexuality 
should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this 
book or not? (2) If someone in your community suggested that a book he or 
she wrote arguing that blacks are genetically inferior should be taken out of 
your public’ library, would you favor removing this book or not? (3) Or 
consider someone who advocates doing away with elections and letting the 
military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your 
community, should he or she be allowed to or not? (4) And what about 
someone who is against all churches and religion? If such a person wanted to 
make a speech in your community, should he or she be allowed to or not?” 
14 The exact wording was: “In the past twelve menths, have you 
initiated any contacts with (1) a federal elected official or someone on the staff 
of such an official, (2) a non elected official in a federal government agency, (3) 
an elected official on the state or local level, and (4) a non-elected official in a 
state or local government agency or board—either in person or by phone or 
letter—about problems or issues with which you were concerned? In the past 
two years, have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration on some 
national or local issues?”  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS 
 
Generation of Social Resources: 
Membership, Social Trust, Talk, and Tolerance 
 
Latent Variable Model of Social Capital 
To examine the generation of social capital as a whole, a latent variable 
model was specified to include two sub-models. In the measurement model, 
the latent variable of social capital was constructed with four measured 
variables, i.e., formal membership, social trust, talk, and tolerance. It was 
assumed that part of the variance in each of the four measures was accounted 
for by the common factor of the social capital concept, and the rest consisted of 
the unique variance in the variable as well as the measurement error. To 
assign units of measurement to the unmeasured latent variable, the parameter 
of formal membership was fixed at 1 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). At the same 
time, the structural model was specified to causally link demographic and 
media use variables to the latent variable of social capital manifested by the 
four measures. 
Among other results, as in Figure 1, formal membership showed the 
largest loading to the concept of social capital with λ = .47, followed by social 
trust (λ = .34), tolerance (λ = .29) and social talk (λ = .22). On the whole, 
however, these four variables were not strongly enough tied together to 
represent the concept of social capital. Fifteen percent of the variance in 
membership, 8.1% of the variance in social trust, 9.8% of the variance in 
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Figure 1. Latent Variable Model of Social Capital  
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
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tolerance, and only 4.8% of the variance in social talk were accounted for by 
the common factor of social capital. 
Among the four demographic variables included as exogenous 
variables that influence other variables, the older (γ = .09), the highly educated 
(γ = .46), and those with higher income (γ = .27) were more likely to hold a 
higher level of social capital assets. Gender, however, did not have a direct 
effect on social capital. And the impact of mass media use variables as 
antecedent endogenous variables was positive for newspaper reading (γ = .29) 
but negative for television watching (γ = -.13). With demographics and mass 
media use variables controlled, 65% of the variance in the concept of social 
capital was explained. 
However, the model with social capital as the latent variable did not fit 
the data very well, producing a large Chi-square value (X2 = 233.51, df = 21, N 
= 2,298) and a small P-value of close to 0. Although the large sample size 
might have contributed to the large Chi-square due to the potential Type-I 
error in rejecting the null hypothesis of perfect model fit (Brown, MacCallum, 
& Kim, 2002), other fit indices also showed poor model fit (Goodness-of-Fit 
Index = 0.98, Root Mean Square Residual = 0.78). 
To identify the source of the model misfit, a standardized residual 
covariance matrix was examined.15 As Table 1 shows, significantly large  
                                                 
15 A residual covariance is a difference between sample covariance and 
implied covariance by the model. A standardized residual is a residual 
divided by its estimated standard error so that it is independent of the units of 
measurement of the variables (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984, p.146). Thus, a 
standard residual that is greater than 2.58, which is two standard deviations 
apart from the perfect fit, is considered significantly large. According to Bollen 
(1989), any non-zero residual covariance suggests covariance between 
variables is either under or over-explained (p.257).  
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Table 1. Standardized Residual Covariance of Latent Variable Model of Social 
Capital (Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
 Membership  Social  Trust Social  Talk  Tolerance 
Age    1.05 3.85 6.46  -10.92 
Gender  -0.42 0.44 -0.85 0.73 
Education   2.76  -2.30  -6.82  4.35 
Income -0.25  -0.74  -2.61  3.23 
Newspaper -0.55 0.85 3.18 -2.72 
Television    3.84 -1.84 -1.31 -2.11 
Membership   -2.01  4.02  -2.61 
Social Trust       3.31  0.59 
Social  Talk      -1.64 
Tolerance     
  
 
65
residual covariances (greater than 2.58) were found between demographic 
variables and social capital measures, between media variables and social 
capital measures, and among the social capital measures themselves. In 
particular, the links that age and education had with social capital measures 
remained unidentified; the largest residuals were found between age and 
tolerance (-10.92), and the relationships that social talk had with age (6.46) and 
with education (-6.82) were also left largely underestimated. Residual 
covariances were also noticeable between newspaper and social talk, 
newspaper and tolerance, and television and membership. Furthermore, 
interrelationships among the measures of social capital, especially between 
social talk and membership, social talk and social trust, and membership and 
tolerance, seemed to contribute to the poor model fit as well, requiring further 
examination. 
 
Individual Indicator Model of Social Capital 
Given the identification of misfit described above, it is clear that the 
latent variable model of social capital was under-specifying not only some of 
the direct impacts on each of the measures of social capital but also the 
potential interrelationships within the different dimensions of the social 
capital concept. Therefore, an alternative model was tested which freed the 
unexplained links instead of limiting each indicator’s relationship to 
dependency on the common factor of social capital. To estimate how 
indicators were related to each other, error terms among the four indicators 
were first set to correlate to each other and only significant relations were 
included in the final model.  
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Compared with the poor fit made by the latent variable model of social 
capital, this model showed good model fit with a Ch-square value of 6.26 (df = 
4, N = 2.481) and a p-value of 0.18. Other fit indices also confirmed the fit by 
high GFI value (0.99) and low RMR value (0.03). And there were no 
statistically significant residual covariances detected. 
Table 2 shows the results from both models separately in order to 
demonstrate the generation of social capital both at the concept level as a 
whole and at the individual indicator level in detail. Overall, the effects of the 
four exogenous variables on social capital were also replicated on each of the 
indicators. Education had strong positive impacts on membership (γ = .25), 
social trust (γ = .13), and tolerance (γ = .17). Income also had positive direct 
effects on membership (γ = .13), social trust (γ = .04), and tolerance (γ = .10). 
The older respondents were more likely to be joiners in organizations (γ = .06), 
social trusters (γ = .09) and social talkers (γ = .13). Gender did not influence 
the generation of social capital at any level. Against this general pattern, 
however, social talk and tolerance stood out; tolerance toward differences 
decreased significantly as people got older (γ = -.17), and talking with others 
socially was not influenced by education as other values were. These 
distinctive patterns were, in fact, what were expected from the relationships 
marked by the largest residual covariances in the previous model. 
As in the latent variable model, more newspaper reading was predicted 
by respondents’ age (γ =.28), being male (γ = -.06), and by high levels of 
education (γ = .11) and income (γ = .13). On the contrary, female (γ = .04), less 
educated respondents (γ = -.16), and people with low income (γ = .19) were 
more likely to watch television. The demographically opposite pattern found 
in media use was also manifested in their effects as antecedent endogenous   
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Table 2. Individual Indicator Model of Social Capital 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
  Age  Sex  Educ.  Incom.  (a)  (b) 
Social 
Capital  (c)  (d) 
Newspaper (a)  .28*  -.06*  .11*  .13*           
                   
  .28*  -.06*  .11*  .13*           
           
Television (b)  -  .04*  -.16*  -.19*        
           
  -  .04*  -.16*  -.19*       
                
Social Capital  .09*  -  .46*  .27*  .29*  -.13*      
                
  .09*  -  .46*  .27*  .29*  -.13*      
           
Membership  (c) .06* - .25*  .13*  .13* - .47*    
 .04*  -.01*  .02*  .02*         
  .09* - .27*  .15*  .13* - .47*    
           
Social trust (d)  .09*  -  .13*  .09*  .10*  -.08*  .34*    
 .03*  -.01*  .02*  .03*         
 .12*  -  .15*  .12*  .10*  -.08*  .34*    
           
Social  talk  .13* -  - .04*  .10*  -.08*  .22*    
 .03*  -.01*  .02*  .03*         
  .15* -  - .07*  .10*  -.08*  .22* .10ψ* .07ψ* 
           
Tolerance -.17*  -  .17*  .10*  .09*  -.05*  .29*    
 .02*  -.01*  .02*  .02*         
 -.14*  -  .19*  .12*  .09*  -.05*  .29*   .05ψ* 
 
Notes: 1)  Cell entries are coefficients indicating direct (first row), indirect (second  
     row) and total (third row) effects. 
2)  *p ≤ .05  
3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients.  
4)  Grey areas represent the effects on and from the latent variable of social  
     capital.  
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variables on most of the social capital assets. Heavy newspaper readers held 
higher levels of social resources: they were more likely to join associations (β 
= .13), trust others more (β  = .10), be involved in social talking (β = .10), and 
be more tolerant of differences (β = .09). On the other hand, television 
watching had no direct effect on membership but negative impacts on social 
trust (β = -.08), social talk (β = -.08), and tolerance (β = -.05). 
After all the effects of demographics and media use were taken into 
account, organizational engagement was still related to talking with others (ψ 
= .10) and trusting general others was significantly related with social talk (ψ 
= .07) and tolerance (ψ = .05). 
 
Individual Indicator Model of Social Capital with Political Talk 
In earlier discussions, the content people talk about was assumed to 
possess different informational values. With respect to interest in political 
participation, therefore, it is important to examine whether and how talking 
about politics in particular serves as social capital that is politically relevant. 
The same analytical procedures testing the latent model and the 
indicator model of social capital were repeated on the additional data sets that 
included political talk as a variable instead of social talk. 
Table 3 displays the results from the National Election Study data. 
Based on the latent variable modeling, political talk was loaded to the concept 
of social capital with λ = .34 and 12% of the variance in political talk accounted 
for as an indicator of social capital. When each indicator was examined 
individually, people who talk about politics turned out to be the highly 
educated (γ = .12), with higher income (γ = .11), heavy newspaper readers (β 
= .09) and television hard news viewers (β = .11). Age and gender were not   
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Table 3. Individual Indicator Model of Social Capital 
(National Election Study) 
 
  Age  Sex  Educ.  Inco.  (a)  (b) 
Social 
Capit
l 
(c)  (d) 
Newspaper (a)  .35*  -.08*  .12*  .11*           
                   
  .35*  -.08*  .12*  .11*           
           
Television news (b)  .31*  -  -  -        
           
  .31*  - - -  .11ψ*       
                
Social Capital  -  .10*  .47*  .25*  .17*  -    
                
  -  .10*  .47*  .25*  .17*  -    
           
           
Membership  (c)  -  -  .23* .12* .08*  -  .48*    
  - -.01* -  -         
 -  -  .24*  .13*  .08  -  .48*    
           
Social trust (d)  .18*  -  .19*  .09*  -  -.10*  .39*    
  - - - -        
  .16* - .19*  .09* - -.10*  .39* .09ψ*  
           
Political  talk  (e)  -  -  .12* .11* .09* .11* .34*    
  .06*  - - -        
  -  -  .12* .12* .09* .11* .34* .12ψ* .11ψ* 
           
Tolerance  -.15*  .13*  .18* - .07* - .31*    
  - - - -        
  -.12* .13* .18* .08* .07*  -  .31*   .06ψ* 
           
 
Notes: 1)  Cell entries are coefficients indicating direct (first row), indirect (second  
                  row) and total (third row) effects. 
2)  *p ≤ .05  
3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients.  
4)  Grey areas represent the effects on and from the latent variable of social  
     capital. 
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significantly related to political talk. Interrelational patterns were also found 
between media use and among the social resources. Newspaper reading and 
television news watching were significantly related to each other after 
demographic controls (ψ = .11). And formal membership was still related to 
social trust (ψ = .09) and talking about politics with others (ψ = .12), and 
trusting general others was significantly related to political talk (ψ = .11) and 
tolerance (ψ = .06). 
 
Membership as a Structural Source of Relational Values 
Given the better fit by the individual indicator model of social capital as 
confirming the multidimensionality of the concept, I further examined the 
causal assumption from the structural dimension to the value dimension. 
Table 5 shows the result of hierarchical regression analyses predicting 
three relational values from formal membership. After controlling for 
demographics and media use variables, the increase in formal membership in 
voluntary associations predicted talking with others more (β = .12) and 
trusting general others more (β = .04). Tolerance, however, was not accounted 
for by formal membership. 
In order to examine how associational membership works in greater 
detail, I ran two additional hierarchical regression analyses predicting each of 
the relational values, the final blocks of which included multiple memberships 
or different types of associations (see Table 6). The number of respondents’ 
membership was dummy-coded into 5 categories from none to 5 or more (see 
Table 4). Talking with others socially gradually increased as people join two or 
more associations. The significant trust-generating role of formal membership, 
however, was not manifested by the effect of multiple memberships. Although  
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Table 4. Distribution of Associational Membership 
 
 
 
Social Capital 
Benchmark Study 
(%) 
National Election 
Study 
(%) 
American Citizen  
Participation Study 
(%) 
 
Whether 
respondents are 
members of 18 
categories of 
voluntary 
associations 
Number of 
organizations 
respondent is a 
member of  
Whether 
respondents are 
members of 20 
categories of 
voluntary 
associations 
Number of 
Membership 
     
0  20.2  58.2  28.5 
1  15.6  18.5  21.5 
2  13.5  11.8  16.1 
3  12.7  6.2  11.8 
4  10.5  2.3  7.3 
5 or more  27.5  3.0  14.8 
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Table 5. Predicting Relational Values from Formal Membership  
(Social capital benchmark)  
 
  Social trust  Social talk  Tolerance 
 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
             
Demographics             
Age  .12**  .09**  .16**  .13**  -.15**  -.17** 
Gender  -.02  -.01  -.03  -.02  .02  .03 
Education  .16**  .13**  .04  -.02  .19**  .17** 
Income  .11**  .08**  .07**  .03  .13**  .11** 
Incr. R-square (%)  6.6**    3.5**    9.2**   
             
Mass Media Use             
Newspaper  .09**  .09**  .10**  .09**  .09**  .09** 
Television  -.08**  -.08**  -.07**  -.07**  -.04*  -.04* 
Incr. R-square (%)  1.3**    1.4**    0.9**   
             
Structure of Relation             
Formal Membership  .04*  .04*  .12**  .12**  .01  .01 
Incr. R-square (%)  .02*    1.3**    0   
Total R-square  8.1**    6.2**    10.0**   
             
 
    Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Table 6. Effect of Multiple Membership and Membership Type on Relational 
Values (Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
 
  Social trust  Social talk  Tolerance 
 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
             
Multiple Membership             
One  -.04  -.03  -.06**  .02  -.01  .02 
Two  .01  .02  -.01  .06**  .00  .02 
Three  -.01  .00  .03  .10**  .01  .03 
Four  -.02  -.02  .05**  .11**  .05*  .06** 
Five or more  .05**  .05  .07**  .15**  -.01  .03 
Incr. R-square (%)  (0.4)    1.8**    0.3   
Total R-square  8.3**    6.7**    10.3**   
             
             
Type of Membership              
Religion  .03  .02  .06**  .03  -.04*  -.09** 
Sports  .00  -.01  .06**  .03  .02  .02 
Youth  .04*  .04*  .09**  .05*  -.01  -.02 
School  .00  -.02  .05**  .02  -.02  -.07** 
Veterans  .00  -.01  .04  .01  .00  .00 
Neighborhood  -.01  -.02  .13**  .12**  .04  .04 
Seniors  .01  .01  .05**  .03  -.03  -.01 
Charity/Social Welfare  .04*  .03  .06**  .02  .06**  .02 
Union  -.02  -.03  .02  .02  .01  .02 
Business/Professional  .08**  .07**  .03  .00  .05*  .04 
Service/Fraternity  .05**  .04  .05**  .02  .02  .03 
Ethnic/Civil Rights  .00  -.02  .00  -.04*  .05**  .01 
Political  .04*  .04  .03  .01  .05**  .02 
Literary/Art  .01  -.02  .04  .00  .04*  -.01 
Hobby  .02  .01  .06**  .03  .03  .01 
Self-help  -.03  -.05*  .01  -.03  .00  -.01 
Internet  -.01  -.01  .02  .02  -.01  .00 
Other  .01  -.01  .02  -.01  .06**  .05* 
Incr. R-square (%)  1.4**    2.9**    2.0**   
Total R-square  9.5**    7.8**    12.0**   
             
 
  Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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people who have five or more memberships were more tolerant than non-
members (β = .06), the overall effect of multiple memberships was not 
significant. 
On the other hand, the effect of membership that depends on types of 
association turned out to be significant across all relational values. Social trust 
was more likely to be boosted when people join associations for youth (β = 
.04), charity or social welfare (β = .04), business/professional (β = .08), or 
service/fraternity (β = .05). Many more associations influenced their members 
to talk with others more; membership in associations of religion (β = .06), 
sports (β = .06), youth (β = .09), school (β = .05), neighborhood (β = .13), 
seniors (β =.05), charity (β = .6), service (β = .05), or hobby (β = .06) 
significantly contributed to the increase in social talking. For tolerance, the 
effect of associational type was significant but the direction of the relations 
was mixed. Whereas associations for charity (β = .06), ethnic/civic rights (β = 
.05), political issues (β = .05), and literacy/art (β = .04) played a significantly 
positive role in promoting tolerance level independently, involvement in 
religious associations (β = -.09) and school-related associations (β = -.07) was 
more likely to make people less tolerant. 
Using data from the American Citizen Participation Study, the effect of 
formal membership was also tested against political talk and tolerance (see 
Table 7). The demographic block explained 17.6% of the variance in political 
talk with influences by age (β = .09), being male (β = -.12), education (β = .27), 
and income (β = .17). Newspaper reading (β = .37) showed the strongest 
influence on political talk and television hard news viewing (β = .15) also 
increased interpersonal communication about politics. Moreover, those who 
join more voluntary associations tended to talk about politics more (β = .18).  
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Table 7. Predicting Relational Values from Formal Membership 
(American Citizen Participation Study)  
 
  Political talk  Tolerance 
 
Before-
entry beta 
Final beta 
Before-
entry beta 
Final beta 
         
Demographics         
Age  .09**  -.04*  -.14**  -.18** 
Gender  -.12**  -.08**  .05**  .06** 
Education  .27**  .12**  .28**  .24** 
Income  .17**  .07**  .10**  .07** 
Incr. R-square (%)  17.6**    13.8**   
         
Mass Media Use         
Newspaper  .37**  .33**  .08**  .06** 
Television hard news  .15**  .08**  .04  .02 
Incr. R-square (%)  12.0**    0.6**   
         
Structure of Relation         
Formal Membership  .18**  .18**  .07**  .07** 
Incr. R-square (%)  2.1**    0.3**   
Total R-square  31.7**    14.7**   
         
   Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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This tendency was in fact the result of multiple memberships in that the level 
of political talk gradually rose as the membership number increased (see Table 
8). Also, in 15 out of 20 cases, being a member of an association was playing as 
a significant predictor for talking about politics. 
Similar to other values, higher levels of education (β = .28) and income 
(β = .10) also increased the level of tolerance (see Table 7). Intolerance, on the 
other hand, was increased with age (β = -.14). Gender mattered, as females (β 
= .05) were more likely to be tolerant than males. And only newspaper 
reading (β = .08), not television news use, promoted a tolerant attitude. 
Associational participation additionally explained the level of tolerance (β = 
.07), accounting for a 0.3% increase in the variance in tolerance. In detail, the 
level of tolerance became significantly greater among those who were 
members of at least four associations or more (see Table 8). Interestingly, the 
overall positive impact of associational membership on tolerance turned out to 
be, in fact, a result of a combination of both tolerance and intolerance 
generated by different memberships. While political (β = .08), literary/art (β = 
.06), education (β = .05), and culture (β = .09) groups help members develop 
tolerant attitudes, memberships in veteran (β = -.05) and ethnic (β = -.08) 
groups had a detrimental effect on tolerance. When these effects were 
combined, the positive effects offset much of the negative impacts. 
The measure of formal associational membership in the National 
Election Data is different from that used in the other studies in that it asked 
respondents to self-report the number of organizations that they are members 
of, without presenting exemplary categories of associations, and this resulted 
in a distribution of membership that was highly skewed to non-members (see 
Table 4). With this caution in mind, I also ran regression analyses to examine  
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Table 8. Effect of Multiple Membership and Membership Type on Relational 
Values (American Citizen Participation Study) 
 
  Political talk  Tolerance 
 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
         
Multiple Membership         
One  -.03  .07**  (-.03)  (.01) 
Two  -.01  .10**  (.02)  (.05) 
Three  .03  .12**  (-.04)  (.00) 
Four  .04*  .13**  .05*  .07** 
Five or more  .12**  .22**  .06*  .09** 
Incr. R-square (%)  2.7**    0.8**   
Total R2  32.3**    15.1**   
         
         
Type of Membership         
Service/Fraternal  .04*  .01  -.02  -.01 
Veteran  .04  .04  -.05*  -.06** 
Religious  .04*  .03  -.03  -.04 
Ethnic  .07**  .06**  -.08**  -.08** 
Senior Citizens  -.04  -.06**  .03  .04 
Women  .05**  .02  .00  -.01 
Union  .02  .00  .01  .02 
Business/Professional  .06**  .03  .03  .03 
Political  .06**  .04  .08**  .06** 
Civic  .07**  .05*  .02  .01 
Liberal/Conservative  .07**  .05**  .01  .00 
Elections  .09**  .06**  .01  .00 
Youth  .05*  .02  -.01  -.02 
Literary/Art  .04*  .02  .06**  .04 
Hobby/Sports  .08**  .06**  .01  .00 
Neighborhood  .07**  .05*  .02  -.01 
Health Service  .06**  .01  .04  .03 
Education  .03  .00  .05*  .03 
Cultural  .03  -.02  .09**  .08** 
Other  .03  .02  .05*  .03 
Incr. R-square (%)  3.5**    3.0**   
Total R2  32.4**    16.7   
         
     
     Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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the effect of formal membership on social trust, political talk, and tolerance. 
As in Table 9, associational involvements turned out to significantly promote 
social trust (β = .10), and political talk (β = .13), but not tolerance. 
 
Social Resources Facilitating Political Participation 
 
Political Mobilizing Effects of Social Resources 
The first political participation model presented in Figure 2 showed a 
good overall model fit, with a Chi-square of 1.71 (df = 1, N = 2,481) and a p-
value of 0.19. Other fit indices also showed a good fit, with GIF = 1.0 and RMR 
= 0.02. The squared multiple correlations by the structural model were 15.2% 
for political interest, 15.1% for newspaper reading, 9.0% for television 
watching, 17.0% for membership, 6.3% for social talk, 9.1% for social trust, and 
10.6% for tolerance. Also, 7.7% of the variance in political trust, 23.5% of the 
variance in political knowledge, and 26.9% of the variance in political 
participation were accounted for by the model. 
Table 10 shows the impacts of four demographic variables on political 
participation. Age had a negative direct effect (γ = -.07) on political 
participation but the indirect effect was positive (γ = .07), resulting in an 
insignificant total effect. Although age had positive links with many variables 
in the model, including political interest (γ = .25), newspaper (γ = .23), social 
trust (γ = .07), social talk (γ = .12), and political knowledge (γ = .13), the 
negative link between age and tolerance (γ = -.18) counterbalanced much of 
the positive indirect effects. 
Gender did not have a direct impact on political participation. 
Indirectly, however, males (γ = -.03) turned out to be more involved  
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Table 9. Predicting Relational Values from Formal Membership  
(National Election Study)  
 
  Social trust  Political talk  Tolerance 
 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
Before-
entry 
beta 
Final 
beta 
             
Demographics             
Age  .17**  .18**  .02  -.04  -.12**  -.14** 
Gender  -.01  .00  .00  .00  .12**  .13** 
Education  .18**  .16**  .15**  .11**  .19**  .16** 
Income  .12**  .10**  .10**  .07*  .07  .05 
Incr. R-square (%)  9.2**    4.5**    7.5**   
             
Mass Media Use             
Newspaper  .02  .02  .11**  .08*  .07*  .06 
Television news  -.08*  -.08*  .11**  .11**  .03  .02 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.6*    1.9**    0.4   
             
Structure of Relation             
Formal Membership  .10**  .10**  .13**  .13**  .06  .06 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.9**    1.5**    0.3   
Total R-square  10.7**    7.9**    8.3**   
             
     Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Note. The exogenous variables were controlled but not included.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Structural Model of Political Participation 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
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Table 10. Effects of Exogenous Variables 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
  Age  Gender  Education  Income 
         
Political Interest  .25*  -.08*  .24*  .09* 
         
  .25*  -.08*  .24*  .09* 
         
Newspaper  .23*  -.05*  .07*  .12* 
  .05*  -.01*  .04*  .02* 
  .28*  -.06*  .11*  .13* 
        
Television   -  .04*  -.15*  -.19* 
  -  - -.01* - 
  - .04*  -.16*  -.19* 
        
Membership   -  -  .21*  .12* 
 .07*  -.02*  .06*  .03* 
 .09*  -  .27*  .15* 
        
Social talk   .12*  -  -  - 
 .04*  -.02*  .06*  .05* 
  .16* -  - .07* 
        
Social trust   .07*  -  .11*  .08* 
 .05*  -.02*  .04*  .04* 
 .12*  -  .15*  .12* 
        
Tolerance   -.18*  -  .16*  .09* 
 .04*  -.01*  .03*  .03* 
 -.14*  -  .19*  .12* 
        
Political  trust  - - - - 
 .07*  -.01*  .06*  .05* 
  .09* - .09* - 
        
Political knowledge .13*  -09*  .16*  .07* 
 .09*  -.03*  .09*  .05* 
 .22*  -.12*  .25*  .12* 
        
Political  -.07* -  - .06* 
Participation  .07* -.03* .17* .09* 
 -  -  .20*  .15* 
        
 
   Notes: 1)  Cell entries are coefficients indicating direct (first row), indirect (second  
        row) and total (third row) effects. 
  2)  *p ≤ .05  
  3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients.  
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politically. This was also supported by other links indicating that males were 
more likely to be interested in politics (γ = -.08), politically more 
knowledgeable (γ = -.09) and read more newspapers (γ = -.05). 
Education was related to political participation mostly through indirect 
paths (γ = .17), especially through positive links with political interest (γ = 
.24), newspaper reading (γ = .07), political knowledge (γ = .16), and with social 
capital variables including membership (γ = .21), social trust (γ = .11), and 
tolerance (γ = .16). Income had a stronger indirect effect (γ = .09) than direct 
effect (γ = .06). Relationships contributing to the significant indirect link were 
similar to those with education. People with high income were associated with 
high levels of political interest (γ = .09), newspaper reading (γ = .12), 
membership (γ = .12), social trust (γ = .08), tolerance (γ = .09), and political 
knowledge (γ = .07). Both education and income were negatively related to 
television viewing (γ = -.15 and γ = -.19), and social talk was the only variable 
among social capital indicators that was not accounted for by either education 
or income. 
The effects of antecedent endogenous variables are presented in Table 
11. Political interest showed both direct (β = .21) and indirect impacts (β = .08) 
on political participation. These indirect links were accounted for by the 
positive relationships political interest had with almost every variable in the 
model, except television and tolerance. 
The positive links that newspaper use had, not only with all of the 
social resource variables but with political trust and political knowledge 
added, accounted for the significant indirect impact of newspaper reading (β = 
.04) on political participation. Nevertheless,  newspaper reading had no direct 
impact on political participation. Television use, on the other hand, was not   
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Table 11. Effects of Endogenous Variables 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i) 
                   
Political                    
Interest (a)                   
                   
                   
Newspaper (b)  .18*                 
                   
  .18*                 
           
Television (c) -           
           
  -          
           
Membership (d)  .19*  .09*  -       
  . 0 2 *           
  .20*  .09*  -       
           
Social talk (e)  .05*  .08*  -.08*  .12*       
  .04*  .01*  -       
  .09*  .09*  -.08*  .12*       
           
Social trust (f)  .06*  .08*  -.08*  -  .08*      
  .03*  .01*  -.01*  .01*       
  .09*  .09*  -.08*  -  .08*      
           
Tolerance (g)  - .08*  -.04* -  - .07*      
  .02* - -.01* -  - -.01*      
  .05*  .08*  -.05*  -  -  .06*     
           
Political trust (h)  .11*  .05* -  - .04*  .20*  -.06ψ*    
  .03* .02* -.02* .01* .02*         
  .14*  .07* -  - .06*  .20*       
           
Political    .23*  .11* -  -  - .06* -  -   
knowledge (i) .03* - -.01* - .01* -    -   
  .26*  .12*  -.04*  - -  .06*  - -  
           
Political  .21* -  - .35* -  - .08*  -.06* - 
Participation  .08*  .04*  - - - - -    
  .29* -  - .35* -  - .08*  -.06* - 
           
 
   Notes: 1)  Cell entries are indicating direct (first row), indirect (second row) and  
                     total (third row) effects. 
  2)  *p ≤ .05  
  3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients. 
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related to political participation either directly or indirectly, despite the 
negative relations with social talk (β = -.08), social trust (β = -.08), and 
tolerance (β = -.04). 
The parts played by the social capital variables with respect to political 
participation showed much more complicated relational patterns. On the 
surface, only formal membership (β = .35) and tolerance (β = .08) were found 
to have direct impacts on political participation. Indirectly, however, far more 
entangled relationships among social trust, social talk, and tolerance were 
present, where political trust and political knowledge were playing unique 
roles, providing some explanations for the mechanism. 
Most of all, formal membership had a direct impact on social talk (β = 
.12) but no impact on any other variables in the model, which ultimately 
caused its indirect impact to be insignificant. Social talk consequently had 
positive links with social trust (β = .08) and political trust (β = .04), but it did 
not affect level of tolerance or political knowledge. Nevertheless, neither 
talking at social settings nor social trust related to political participation at any 
level. 
Tolerance was neither membership-based nor affected by social talk. 
Only those who trust others tended to be more tolerant (β = .07). 
Political trust turned out to hold a very important key to explaining the 
function of social trust in the process of political participation. That is, the 
seemingly insignificant effect of social trust on political participation might 
have something to do with its strong relevance to political trust (β = .20) and, 
subsequently, the negative impact of political trust (β = -.06) on political 
participation. Moreover, political trust was negatively associated with  
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tolerance (ψ = -.06). Finally, political knowledge did not have a direct impact 
on political participation. 
 
Political Mobilizing Effects of Politically Relevant Social Resources 
Next, the political participation model was run with the National 
Election Study data, which allowed examining the impacts of more politically 
relevant social resources, particularly in the context of an election. At an 
individual media-use level, exposure to television hard news use was 
examined, for it was more likely to provide politically relevant information, 
compared with general overall exposure. At a social resource level, talking 
about politics with others has been known as a direct political stimulus 
toward participatory outcomes, which social conversation cannot provide. 
The relationships specified as in Figure 3 produced a saturated model. 
This model accounted for a total of 34.2 % of the variance in political 
participation. The squared multiple correlations for the other endogenous 
variables were 11.2% for campaign interest, 16.8% for newspaper reading, 
16.6% for television news watching, 11.2% for membership, 17.0% for political 
talk, 10.9% for social trust, 10.1% for tolerance, and 3.6% and 40.8% for 
political trust and political knowledge, respectively. 
Similar to the results obtained with the previous model, demographics 
manifested their impacts indirectly rather then directly (see Table 12). The 
impact of age (γ = .09) on political participation was valid only through 
indirect links. Among the relationships accounting for the indirect effects, the 
positive impacts on many variables, such as campaign interest (γ = .21), 
newspaper (γ = .33), television hard news (γ = .25), social trust (γ = .18), and 
political knowledge (γ = .14), seemed to be slightly offset by the negative   
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Note. The exogenous variables were controlled but not included. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Structural Model of Political Participation 
(National Election Study) 
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Table 12. Effects of Exogenous Variables  
(National Election Study) 
 
  Age  Gender  Education  Income 
         
Campaign interest  .21*  -.09*  .20*  .08* 
         
  .21*  -.09*  .20*  .08* 
         
Newspaper  .33*  -.08*  .10*  .10* 
  -  -  -  - 
  .35*  -.08*  .12*  .11* 
      
Television hard news  .25*  .09*  -.08*  - 
  .06* -.02* .05* .02* 
  .31* -  -  - 
      
Membership   -  -  .21*  .11* 
 -  -.02*  .03*  .02* 
 -  -  .24*  .13* 
      
Social trust   .18*  -  .15*  - 
 -  -  .04*  .02* 
 .16*  -  .19*  .09* 
      
Political talk   -.07*  -  -  - 
  .10* -.03* .10* .05* 
 -  -  .12*  .12* 
      
Tolerance   -.16*  .12*  .15*  - 
 .04*  -  .03*  .02* 
 -.12*  .13*  .18*  .08* 
      
Political  trust  - - - - 
  - - - - 
  - - - - 
      
Political knowledge  .14* -.14* .24* .13* 
  .11* -.03* .11* .06* 
  .25* -.17* .35* .19* 
      
Political Participation -  -  .08*  - 
 .09*  -  .18*  .10* 
 .08*  -  .26*  .09* 
      
 
   Notes: 1)  Cell entries are coefficients indicating direct (first row), indirect (second  
                     row) and total (third row) effects. 
  2)  *p ≤ .05 
  3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients. 
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impact of age on tolerance (γ = -.16). Although the direct link between age and 
political talk was also negative (γ = -.07), it did not contribute to the offset 
because the positive indirect links (γ = .10) made the negativity disappear. 
Gender did not relate to political participation at all.  
The indirect impact (γ = .18) was greater than the direct impact (γ = .08) 
for education, too, explaining its positive links with almost all the variables in 
the model, either directly or totally, except for political trust. The positive 
relationships that income had with other variables, aside from television hard 
news and political trust, also made its indirect impact on political 
participation significant (γ = .10). 
The influences of endogenous variables are presented in Table 13. 
Whereas interest in the ongoing campaign directly (β = .23) influenced 
political mobilization, its strong impacts on television hard news use (β = .27), 
talking about politics (β = .23), and political knowledge (β = .20) were 
especially noteworthy in accounting for the indirectly significant influence of 
campaign interest on political participation (β = .13). The more respondents 
were interested in campaigns, however, the less likely they were to trust 
political systems to do the right things (β = -.07). 
Although newspaper use and television hard news use were 
reinforcing each other’s reliance (ψ= .09), neither use was related to political 
participation. Reading newspapers, however, increased political participation 
indirectly (β = .06) through its positive effects on membership (β = .08), 
political talk (β = .07), and political knowledge (β = .15). 
Associational membership facilitated political participation both 
directly (β = .23), and indirectly (β = .03) by generating social trust (β = .09) 
and political talk (β = .11). Sequentially, social trust and political talk turned   
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Table 13. Effects of Endogenous Variables 
(National Election Study) 
 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i) 
                   
Campaign                   
Interest (a)                   
                   
                   
Newspaper (b)  -                 
                   
  -                 
           
Television (c)  . 2 7 *           
           
  .27* .09ψ*          
           
Membership (d)  .08*  .08*  -.07*        
  -          
  -  .08*  -.07*        
           
Social trust (e)  .08*  -  -.11*  .09*       
  -.02*  -  -       
  .05*  -  -.12*  .09*       
           
Political talk (f)  .34*  .07*  -  .11*       
  -  -  -       
 .36*  .08*  -  .11*  .08ψ*      
           
Tolerance (g)  - - - -  .07*  -      
  .04*  -  -  .01*       
  - .07* -  - .07* -       
           
Political  trust  -.07* -  -  - .18* - -.08ψ*    
  - -  -.02*  - - -      
  -.08* -  -  - .17* - -.09*    
           
Political    .20*  .15* -  - .12*  .08* -  -   
knowledge (i) .04* - -.02*  .02* -  -    -   
  .24* .16*  -  .06* .12* .09*  -  -   
           
Political  .23* -  - .23* - .23* - -.06*  .13* 
Participation  .13*  .06* - .03* - .02*  .01* -  - 
  .36* -  - .26* - .25* - -.07*  .13* 
           
 
   Notes: 1)  Cell entries are coefficients indicating direct (first row), indirect (second  
                     row) and total (third row) effects. 
  2)  *p ≤ .05  
  3)  Coefficients marked with ψ represent bi-directional psi-coefficients. 
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out to vary together (ψ = .08) as they serve different roles in the process of 
political mobilization.16 Talking with others about politics, on the one hand, 
fostered political involvement both directly (β = .23), and indirectly (β = .02) 
through enhanced political knowledge (β = .08). The role of social trust, on the 
other hand, was trickier in that it did not have any impact on political 
participation, despite its positive links with tolerance (β = .07), political trust 
(β = .18), and political knowledge (β = .12). Among these three significant 
links, the more people trust the government or political system, the less they 
participate (β = -.06). On the contrary, political informedness (β = .13) 
advanced the increase in political participation. Although tolerance did not 
make it to political participation, being tolerant made people less trusting 
politically and vice versa (ψ = -.08). 
 
Moderating Effect of Social Resources in  
Facilitating Political Participation 
 
The following analyses tested the final set of research questions dealing 
with how the interplay between capitals at the individual level, i.e., education 
and mass media use, and social capital assets accounts for political 
participation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 When the relationships between social trust and political talk were 
causally modeled, the link from social trust to political talk had β = .09, and 
the link from political talk to social trust was β = .10 (results not shown).  
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Interaction Effects with Education 
In order to examine whether and how social resources moderate the 
relationship between education and political participation, a standardized 
multiplicative term between education and each of the four social resource 
variables was entered in four separate hierarchical regression analyses after 
controlling for demographics, media use, and the social resource variable of 
interest. 
From the Social Capital Benchmark Study, education was found to 
significantly interact with two forms of social resources (see Table 14). Among 
the demographics, education’s main effect on political participation was 
significant, as expected (β = .20). After controlling for demographics, political 
attitude, and media use, associational membership showed a strong main 
effect (β = .36) and a significant interaction effect with education (β = .05). The 
finding for the significant interaction term between education and formal 
membership was plotted in Figure 4. As indicated by a steeper slope for the 
high-education group, the positive effect of formal membership on political 
participation was significantly greater for those who are highly educated than 
for the less educated. Consequently, the participation inequality initially 
created by human capital became larger with the increase in involvement in 
associational activities, a form of the social resources. 
For social talk, the interaction effect with education was also significant 
at β = .05 despite a relatively marginal main effect (β = .04). When plotted, the 
education-based participation gap appeared even more exacerbated by the 
seemingly contrasting influences of social talk on two educational subgroups 
(see Figure 5). That is, as people talk with others more frequently, the more 
educated tended to become more involved as political participants while the   
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Table 14. Interaction Effect between Social Resource and Education  
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
 
 
Education 
x 
Membership 
 
Education 
x 
Social talk 
       
Demographics       
Age    (.01)   
Gender    (.00)   
Education    .20**   
Income    .15**   
R-square (%)    8.7**   
       
Political Attitude       
Political interest    .28**   
R-square (%)    6.8**   
       
Mass Media Use       
Newspaper    (.03)   
Television    (-.04)   
Incr. R-square (%)    0.2*   
       
Social Resource       
Membership  .36**     
Social talk      .04* 
Incr. R-square (%)  10.4**    0.2* 
       
Interaction       
Educ. * Social resource  .05**    .05* 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.2**    0.2* 
Total R2  26.8**    16.2** 
       
        Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Figure 4. Interaction Effect between Formal Membership and Education 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
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Figure 5. Interaction Effect between Social Talk and Education 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
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less educated were either not affected much or showed a tendency to further 
withdraw from participatory behaviors. 
In a similar way, formal membership and talking about politics with 
others turned out to significantly interact with education in accounting for 
political mobilization in the more politically relevant context based on data 
from the National Election Study (see Table 15). Again, education showed a 
significant main effect at β = .25. After controlling for demographics, 
campaign interest, and news media use, both formal membership and political 
talk showed strong main effects (β = .25 and β = .28, respectively). 
Despite independent positive main effects, education and formal 
membership turned out to interact negatively (β = -.07). The plot in Figure 6 
shows how this negative interaction influences the relationship between 
education and political participation. Noticeably, the slope indicating the main 
effect of formal membership on political participation was steeper for the low-
education group than for the high-education group. This suggested that the 
positive correlation between education and political participation became 
weaker as people got more involved in associational activities. This may be 
the case where the rather steady slope for the high-education group was the 
result of the ceiling imposed by formal membership. Because there is a limit to 
the number of memberships one can have, it is possible that, beyond a certain 
point, additional memberships make no difference in its mobilizing impact. 
On the other hand, the result of the significant interaction effect that 
political talk had with education (β = .11) is shown in Figure 7. As indicated 
by the steeper slope for the high-education group, the highly educated were 
more likely to participate politically than the less educated, and this 
educational difference in political participation was far greater when people  
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Table 15. Interaction Effect between Social Resource and Education  
(National Election Study) 
 
 
Education 
x 
Membership 
 
Education 
x 
Political talk 
       
Demographics       
Age    .07*   
Gender    (-.01)   
Education    .25**   
Income    .10**   
R-square (%)    10.0**   
       
Political Attitude       
Campaign interest    .35**   
R-square (%)    10.8**   
       
Mass Media Use       
Newspaper    (.05)   
Television hard news    (-.04)   
Incr. R-square (%)    0.3   
       
Social Resource       
Membership  .25**     
Political talk      .28* 
Incr. R-square (%)  5.7**    6.4* 
       
Interaction       
Educ. * Social resource  -.07*    .11** 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.4**    1.3** 
Total R2  27.2**    28.8** 
       
 
         Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Figure 6. Interaction Effect between Formal Membership and Education 
(National Election Study) 
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Figure 7. Interaction Effect between Political Talk and Education 
(National Election Study) 
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talk about politics more frequently than not. To the less educated groups, the 
mobilizing effect was relatively minimal. As a result, by benefiting the highly 
educated more than the less educated, the informational function of talking 
about politics further reinforced, rather than weakened, the educational 
difference in political mobilization. 
 
Interaction Effects with Media Use 
Significant interplays between media use and the social resource 
variables were found in two relations: between the time spent watching 
television and social talk, and between watching television news use and 
formal membership (see Table 16). 
Although neither measure of television use had any independent 
impact on political participation, the ways in which they interact with social 
resources could expose reasons for the ineffectiveness of television use. 
First, the negative interaction effect between television watching and 
social talk (β = -.05) in conjunction with the significant main effect of social 
talk (β = .04) was plotted in Figure 8.1. At first look, the plot suggested that 
social talking encouraged political participation and this overall positive effect 
was far greater among those who watched television less frequently than 
among those who watched television more frequently. This result was of no 
surprise given that talking with others in social settings further amplified the 
negative effect of television on political participation by mobilizing the light 
viewers far more than the heavy viewers. In detail, however, television 
watching was found to play two distinctive roles depending on the level of 
social talking, which ultimately resulted in rendering television’s overall 
mobilizing role insignificant. An alternative plot of the relationships across the   
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Table 16. Interaction Effect between Social Resource and Media Use  
 
 
Social Capital 
Benchmark Study 
 
National Election 
Study 
 
Media use 
x 
Social talk 
 
Media use 
x 
Membership 
       
Demographics       
Age  (.01)    .07* 
Gender  (.00)    (-.01) 
Education  .20**    .25** 
Income  .15**    .10** 
R-square (%)  8.7**    10.0** 
       
Political Attitude       
Political interest  .28**    .35** 
Campaign interest      10.9** 
R-square (%)  6.8**     
       
Mass Media Use       
Newspaper  (.03)    (.05)  
Television  (-.04)     
Television hard news      (-.04) 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.2*    .03 
       
Social Resource       
Membership      .25** 
Social talk  .04*     
Incr. R-square (%)  0.2*    5.7** 
       
Interaction       
Newspaper * Social 
resource 
(.01) 
 
(.01) 
Television * Social 
resource 
-.05** 
 
.08** 
Incr. R-square (%)  0.3*    0.6* 
Total R2  16.2**    27.5** 
       
 
     Note:   *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Figure 8.1 Interaction Effect between Social Talk and Television Use 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study) 
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Figure 8.2. Interaction Effect between Social Talk and Television Use 
(Social Capital Benchmark Study)
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three variables (see Figure 8.2) showed that the increase in the time spent 
watching television corresponded with a dramatic drop in political 
participation among those who talked with others more frequently. For the 
less frequent social talkers, by contrast, television watching did encourage 
political participation. 
Next, following the significant main effect of formal membership (β = 
.25), interaction between television news with formal membership was also 
significant at β = .08. As indicated in Figure 9.1, the direction of the 
relationship between television news and political participation was reversed 
from negative to positive as the level of formal membership increased. When 
not accompanied by the social resource, television news did not play the 
mobilizing role, even discouraging engagement among heavy television news 
viewers.  However, the relationship was reversed with increases in 
associational membership so that those who watched television news more 
frequently also participated more than those who watched television news 
less frequently. An additional plot shows more clearly this oppositional 
pattern of relationships involving two membership subgroups. As in Figure 
9.2, the negative function of television use on political participation was found 
only among those with no or fewer group memberships. For those with more 
group memberships, television news watching increased participation in 
political activities.  
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Figure 9.1. Interaction Effect between Formal Membership and Television 
News Use (National Election Study) 
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Figure 9.2. Interaction Effect between Formal Membership and Television 
News Use (National Election Study)
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Review of the Results 
In assessing the social explanation of political behaviors, this study 
avoided simply gathering dispersed social variables and examining their 
distinctive contributions to the participatory outcomes. Instead, I saw a need 
for devising a conceptual tool to embrace these social variables together into a 
coherent ‘social resource model’ and I tried to address some of the unsolved 
issues regarding political participation using the frameworks provided by the 
model. In carrying out the objectives, three sets of research questions were 
developed and analyzed, and meaningful results were obtained. 
 
Generation of Social Resources 
While dealing with the first set of research questions, this study 
demonstrated that criticisms of the conceptual ambiguity of the concept of 
social capital were reasonably held. As was confirmed by the poor fits of the 
latent variable models, social capital was not a concept representing a blanket 
feature by itself. Instead, it was more likely to be a composite of various 
resources from social relations, each of which was distinctively distributed by 
individual resources yet connected to each other with a functional 
commonality. 
As a whole, those who are rich in individual resources, i.e., the older, 
the highly educated, the more affluent, and those who read newspapers more 
frequently, possessed higher levels of social capital. Individually, however, 
different forms of social resources were distinctively related to the various  
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individual resources; among other variables, tolerance tended to deteriorate as 
people got older, and social talk was unrelated or less related to 
socioeconomic status. Television watching indeed impeded building social 
capital, regardless of what people watched. According to one observed 
exception, content mattered as some have claimed (Hooghe, 2002; Moy et al., 
1999; Norris, 1996; Shah, 1998): watching television news triggered political 
discussion with others. 
Different forms of social resources were, however, still related to each 
other in sharing the common denominator, social capital. Such 
interrelationships were supported partly by the so-called ‘virtuous’ effect of 
the structural dimension of the resource on generation of other values of the 
resources, especially social talk and political talk. The effect on social trust was 
significant yet rather weak. However, not all values were defined as relational 
virtues. Tolerance was not universally network-based. To be more precise, it 
turned out to depend on network type. According to the findings of this study, 
joining groups that were devoted to issues of religion, ethnicity, schools or 
veterans affairs was identified as a source of intolerance. Nevertheless, the 
overall effect of associational membership on tolerance could be positive if the 
beneficial effect of multiple memberships was large enough to counteract the 
possible downside of social relations caused by certain types of group 
membership, as found from the American Citizen Participation Study. 
 
Mobilizing Functions of Social resources 
This study showed that the multi-dimensionality and interrelationships 
identified in the generation of social resources were also reflected in their 
impacts on political participation. And this further helped to identify the key  
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mechanisms through which certain social resources are effectively utilized to 
increase citizen engagement in political activities. 
Most of all, this study showed that different dimensions and forms of 
social resource made differential contributions to political participation. While 
formal associational membership showed a consistently strong effect on 
political participation, the roles played by relational values were far more 
complicated. 
Despite its magnitude at the heart of social capital, social trust was not 
an effective resource that could be utilized in promoting political 
participation; trusting general others was not related to political participation 
at any level. More significantly, this study uncovered why the ‘participation-
inducing’ mechanism of trust could not work under political contexts. The 
relationship between social trust and political trust and its impact on political 
participation was of particular importance to explain this. In other words, this 
study confirmed the wider-level leap of trust from general others to political 
systems or politicians. Rather contradictorily, though, the result of this study 
also supported the previous findings in which citizen participation was more 
likely to be provoked by political distrust or cynicism, not by political trust. 
Therefore, whereas social trust contributes collaboration at the social level by 
restraining the malice of self-interest, it could not do so politically because it 
overly subdued even a healthy dose of political distrust or cynicism. 
As far as political mobilization by informational variables is concerned, 
this study indicated that social talk and political talk did function differently. 
Although interpersonal discussion about any subject was rooted in social 
relations, a simple flow of information did not guarantee political mobilization. 
Talking about political issues stimulated participation in political activities not  
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only directly but also by enhancing political knowledge. Social talk, in contrast, 
was related to neither political knowledge nor political participation. 
Although talking with others socially increased the willingness to trust others, 
the ‘trust-building mechanism’ of social talk did not develop into the 
‘emancipating mechanism’ under the political context. 
Finally, tolerance was neither network-based nor affected by certain 
information transmitted from social or political discussions. Only those who 
trust others were more likely to be tolerant, supporting the affective over the 
cognitive mechanism of tolerance development. That is, once trusting 
relationships are established, dissimilarities become less conspicuous or are 
perceived less seriously so that people become open-minded toward 
differences more easily. Furthermore, being tolerant of different or 
oppositional political views enabled political engagement in two different 
ways. Political participation was facilitated directly by those who were more 
tolerant because of their perceived freedom to express their views and act on 
them (Social Capital Benchmark Study). Indirectly, on the other hand, it was 
also possible that if a strong faith in civil liberties develops into a constructive 
criticism to check how poorly political systems live up to these faiths, it may 
promote political participation among those who are highly tolerant (National 
Election Study). 
 
Interaction Effects of Social Resources at the Indivdual Level 
This study showed that the utilization of social resources could 
meaningfully explain political participation above and beyond the influences 
of individual resources. In addition, some forms of social resources are 
significantly interacting with resources at the individual level, reinforcing or  
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substituting the relationships between the individual resources and political 
participation. 
Most of all, the structural and the communicative forms of social 
resources turned out to add to the political reservoir of those who are highly 
educated, strengthening educational inequality. This is not to say that the less 
educated were not stimulated at all by having formal memberships or talking 
with others about politics. But it was those who had completed more years of 
formal education who benefited more from the potential mobilization effect of 
social relations and thus participated more. 
The effects of social conversation and associational membership, 
especially on those who were in the lower bracket of education, showed two 
opposite exceptions. Simple talking devoid of political substance even 
aggravated the likelihood of participation among those who were not 
competent to participate in the first place. And when this ceiling was imposed 
on those with higher levels of education as in the National Election Study, 
joining formal membership played a role in complementing the lack of human 
resource; the effect of multiple memberships on political participation was 
greater for those who were in lower educational brackets. 
Unlike the general assumption of the positive role of newspaper use on 
political participation, the findings of this study suggested that newspaper 
reading did not have any impact on political participation. This is in fact 
consistent with other studies in which newspapers’ role was insignificant or 
even detrimental. Several factors were identified as possible causes. For 
example, newspapers do not cover as much information that is directly related 
to mobilizing people into various political activities as in the past, due partly 
to competition with other contents or with other media (Barnhurst & Mutz,  
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1997; Lemert, 1984). Increases in bad news or attack journalism focusing on 
scandals and the negative aspect of politics were identified as producing a 
“media malaise” that causes political alienation (Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, & 
Bennett, 1999; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Fallows, 1997; Patterson, 2002). Moy 
et al. (2005) also argued that the effects of newspaper reliance on political 
participation are not so much direct as mediated by other cognitive and 
affective factors. On top of this, no significant interaction was found between 
social resources and newspaper use in their effects on political participation. 
By contrast, at least two forms of social resource were found to 
moderate the generally negative or insignificant effect of television use on 
political participation. And this revealed an interesting venue in which 
different types of television use and different social resources in terms of 
mobilizing effect can account for political participation. 
First, the negative role of television use on political participation was 
further amplified by social resources. Although the mobilizing effect of social 
talk was weak, it was the light viewers who reaped the benefit from talking 
with others and, as a result, became politically involved. Interestingly, it was 
those who talked with others more frequently who were more influenced by 
the negative effect of television watching. The reason that the negative effect 
of television was more prevalent among the frequent social talkers seems to be 
related to the ‘time displacement’ function of television discussed earlier. In 
particular, this study demonstrated that the degree of displacement varied by 
the amount of social time. In other words, the more social time one invests in 
talking with others, the greater the chance that it will be replaced by time 
spent watching television. For those who had little social time in the first place, 
television’s influence was irrelevant or minimal.  
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From the media characteristics’ point of view, the results are 
inconclusive in determining whether watching public affairs or news can 
contribute to political participation or not. By considering their interactions 
with social resources, this study could reveal that television news was 
showing two differential roles depending on the degree of the social relational 
benefit. That is, television news use increased the likelihood of political 
participation among active joiners in formal associations, but its effect was 
negative among those with no or fewer memberships. With respect to the 
stronger negative function of television news among those with a lower level 
of social resources, the ‘worldview’ explanation seemed to fit more reasonably. 
Sustaining the statement by Postman (1986) that “[television’s] form works 
against the content,” it seems likely that the misanthropic and individualistic 
worldview portrayed by television in general was no exception to the news 
programs. According to the finding of this study, however, this negative effect 
could be reduced considerably if, but only if, television news viewing was 
accompanied by more realistic and collaborative feedbacks based on social 
relations through joining formal associations. Social resources played an 
important role in counterbalancing the effect of television news’ perceived 
reality on political alienation and in helping television news function in the 
informative role and further facilitate political participation. The double-dose 
effect of the potential of television news plus formal group membership, 
therefore, further polarized the participation gap. 
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Limitations and Remaining Issues 
 
In Data Sets 
By utilizing secondary data sources that included an extensive range of 
measures needed for this study, I could assess the full picture of the social 
resource model with respect to political participation. Despite benefits in 
terms of saving cost and time for data collection, especially for the national-
level samples, it was unavoidable to have limitations in comparing and 
generalizing the results across different data sets. In order to address the 
shortcomings, I carefully described each type of measurement and the data 
collection procedures in detail in the methods section.  
As far as the different political contexts are concerned between the 
election studies and the non-election social study, I excluded the voting item 
for the measure of political participation from the election studies and only 
dealt with rather expressive or collective forms of participation that are based 
on resources distinct from those required for voting. This allowed the current 
study to be more pertinent to the discussion of social capital because it was the 
collaborative type of participation, not the individualistic form of voting, that 
was more vulnerable to the collective action problem of free-riding.  
 
In Model Building 
Besides shortcomings in data sets, it is also necessary to address some 
of the issues involved in building the social resource model and its political 
mobilizing mechanism.  
Most of all, the focus on the formal, voluntary organization as the 
structural foundation of social resource has been criticized as the outdated  
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Tocquevillian romanticism of associational life (Levi, 1996). Scholars instead 
have suggested that studies should look at the roles played by informal 
networks (Ikeda, 2002; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998) or the influences by 
social culture or political system at the broader level (Schudson, 1998; Skocpol, 
1996, March/April) to better deal with the generation or erosion of social 
capital.  
It might be true that the informal aspects of social relations account for 
many daily activities and the relevant individual-level decisions, 
informational flows, or attitudes relatively easily. Instead of simply switching 
to or adding casual relations in the model, however, I tried to adhere to 
resources that need to be eagerly obtained and secured by individuals, and to 
focus on how they are transformed into collaborative assets, which tends to 
vary by the type of organizations. For future research, it will be surely 
interesting to explore how the formal and informal networks counterbalance 
or reinforce each other’s networking. For example, it is possible that those 
who are active in the friends- or family-based networking might also be 
organizational participants. In contrast, bonds that tend to be too intense 
within such networks might jeopardize the motivation or capability for 
organizational involvement. Although looking at the problem of social 
decapitalization as a consequence of disconnected culture, governmental 
policy, or even the nature of politics rather than disconnected individuals 
might provide meaningful insights, too, it was beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
Another issue to address is related to the focus on the utility of social 
resources vs. on the influence by political participation. Basically, the social 
resource model of this study was an attempt to explain political participation  
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from social activism and the relevant social values. However, several studies 
have pointed out that research on the political utility of social resource are less 
useful because the results tend to be indirect or too complicated to verify, 
therefore, it should be treated as endogenized to politics (see R. W. Jackman & 
Miller, 1998). In fact, the characteristics and abilities of the politically active 
were found to explain democratic values and other participatory attitudes 
such as political tolerance, interest or trust (M. R. Jackman, 1978; McClosky, 
1964).  
Nevertheless, focusing on the behavioral consequence of social 
resources, rather than the social and relational outcome of political resources, 
has more practical implications in terms of the application of the social 
resource model and its utility in enhancing political mobilization. This is 
because resources, in either additionally available forms or in substituting the 
previously ineffective forms, are most needed among those who are politically 
inactive and less resourceful. And finding ways to access to or develop proper 
forms of resources for them should be an important object for a successful 
political campaign.   
With respect to developing strategies for media campaigns, this study 
is also constrained by not accounting for the significance of the Internet in its 
relation to the construction of social capital and in its politically mobilizing 
role. Although the problem was mainly attributed to the unavailability of the 
measure within the data sets used, it is still worthwhile to mention the 
potential of this new medium not only as an individual level resource that can 
interact with social resources but also as a network of relations that can 
constitute social resource at a virtual level through on-line communities. 
Putnam (2000) raises an interesting question regarding the Internet-based  
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social capital; whereas the “Net” can provide social capital without “barriers 
of time and distance,” the virtual social capital can be “a contradiction in 
terms” (pp. 170-171). In fact, just like television was associated with the 
erosion of social capital, the Internet was found to have all the features that 
can transform the leisure and social time into the private or individualistic 
time and more to reduce off-line interactions including one’s community 
involvement (Kraut et al., 1998; Turkle, 1996, Winter). On the other hand, 
because of its unfathomable capacity for information and connectivity, the 
Internet has been known as the most efficient tool capable of reinforcing or 
replacing the classic forms of social connection and furthermore political 
engagement (Bimber, 1998; Rheingold, 1994). Though not completely agreed, 
taking the relationship between the on-line and off-line interactions into 
consideration will enrich the social resource model by accounting for 
competing environments in the media system and in the networks of relations 
as well.  
 
Implications and Suggestions 
Despite the shortcomings and remaining issues, this dissertation has 
important implications for the three respective research areas that were 
incorporated in the social resource model of political participation: social 
capital, media effects, and political participation. 
Most of all, it contributed to the development of the concept of social 
capital and, in turn, to the expansion of the applicability of the concept. 
Although not all aspects of the concept were considered—only four forms of 
social resources were examined—this dissertation provided a useful analytical 
framework for empirically treating this hypothetical concept that is composed  
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of assorted features of social relations that otherwise could not have been tied 
together. And by empirically sorting out the complications involved in the 
conceptual and subsequent analytical practices of social capital, the much 
assumed relationships both in support of and in contrast to the concept were 
tested. As a result, this study confirmed that the concept did possess 
conflicting elements in itself, the manifestation of which should be looked at 
on two different levels. That is, the so-called ‘dark side’ of social capital was 
identified not only by the conflicting relevance to other forms of social 
resources but also by the contradictory function to a specific outcome. And 
these two distinct levels did not always correspond to each other, as in the 
case of social trust and tolerance. This further implies that, while the 
productive function is treated as context-specific, the model for the generation 
of social resources was constructed universally so that it can be applied to a 
broader range of behavioral consequences beyond the political context. 
Second, by exposing the significant interplays between social resources 
and mass media use at the individual level, this dissertation played the role of 
corroborating some of the important issues in political communication 
research. For example, this study supported the line of research that focuses 
on the interaction between media use and interpersonal discussion in better 
accounting for how people get politically informed and engaged. After all, 
talking with others, not only as an interpersonal communicative pattern but 
also as a resource based on social relations, seems to hold a key to further 
elucidating the many ways that mass media use has impacted civic and 
political participation. 
As far as the effect of television news is concerned, this study added 
new meaning to the differential roles it plays instead of being either  
 
116
consistently positive or consistently negative. From the individual resource’s 
perspective, television news has been found by some to be “news for the 
initiated”(Findahl & Hoijer, 1981, p.401) and “activating the active” (Norris, 
2000a, p.18), of which those who are highly educated are the main 
beneficiaries. From the social resources perspective, this study revealed that 
those who were rich in social resources were also the initiated or the active in 
terms of utilizing information from television news, which in turn was 
transformed into democratic participation. In this study, the generally 
negative stance of television watching was further reinforced by the dual 
effects of the de-capitalizing and the de-mobilizing impacts of television 
watching. And interestingly, this combined effect was explained by 
television’s time-displacement function, which was stronger for those who 
invested more time to acquire social resources 
Finally, this dissertation validated the social resource model by 
showing that political (dis)engagement could be meaningfully explained by 
understanding why some people are better or more poorly mobilized into 
becoming political participants by utilizing certain forms of social resources, 
regardless of or beyond their individual capabilities or options. Furthermore, 
the elaborated version of the social resource model that incorporated the 
influence of the individual capabilities and options on the part played by 
social resources also showed that social resources are in fact reinforcing the 
works of individual capital on political participation. 
Interestingly, the one very promising interactive pattern concerning the 
relationship between individual capital and social capital was not supported. 
According to those who defended the substituting role of social capital 
(Bourdieu, 1983; DeFilippis, 2001; Nie et al., 1996; Teachman et al., 1997; Verba  
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et al., 1995), social resources were expected to play a unique role in 
complementing and further overcoming the lack of other resources so that 
inequalities in the levels of political participation could be narrowed. Out of 
six significant interactions found, four relationships were evidence for the 
opposite; formal memberships, social talk, and political talk hardly worked as 
complementing for the less educated or for heavy television viewers. These 
findings are not very optimistic in terms of the development of democratic 
citizenship. When only those who are already capable of voicing their interests 
keep making their voices heard by actively participating in various political 
activities, the opportunities for political minorities to express their views are 
more likely to disappear than remain intact. 
It is reasonable, then, to presume that a particular social resource that is 
necessary and most suitable to mobilizing those who lack specific individual 
resources may be different from the generally acknowledged forms of social 
resources. For example, participation in voluntary associations may not work 
as an appropriate channel for the less educated to obtain resources not 
possessed by them. According to Green and Brock (2005), informal 
interactions played roles that were as significant as those played by the formal 
kinds in solving collective action problems; they were particularly effective in 
building feelings of connectedness or social support and in providing 
opportunities for expressing personal views. Given that intimate and familiar 
relations “have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more 
easily available” (Granovetter, 1983, p.209), being “schmoozers,” or having 
“bonding” kinds of relations or “strong ties” may well be a special route to 
obtaining social resources among lower status people. Scholars who approach 
social capital from network theories also maintain that social capital that we  
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know of in general may be more oriented toward higher status in society. 
Social capital, according to Lin (2001b), can also be significantly used “to 
defend against possible resource losses” (p.19), a function that is pertinent 
mainly to those who already have many resources. If this makes for a 
reasonable case, studies on the effects of social resources should consider the 
power-laden aspects of the use of resources. And it has further implications 
for future research on the social explanation of political participation. That is, 
the nexus where social resources meet individual resources should be the focal 
point for the social resource model of political participation.  
  119
REFERENCES 
Abramson, P. R., & Aldrich, J. H. (1982). The decline of electoral 
participation in America. American Political Science Review, 76(3), 502-521. 
Alford, R. R., & Scoble, H. M. (1968). Sources of local political 
involvement. American Political Science Review, 62, 1192-1206. 
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and exchanges. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 
343-362. 
Austin, E. W., & Pinkelton, B. E. (1995). Positive and negative effects of 
political disaffection on the less experienced voter. Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, 39(215-235). 
Barnhurst, K. G., & Mutz, D. C. (1997). American journalism and the 
decline in event-centered reporting. Journal of Communication, 47(27-53). 
Beatty, k., & Walter, O. (1984). Religious preference and practice: 
Reevaluating their impact on political tolerance. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
48(318-329). 
Becker, G. (1964). Human capital. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Bennett, S. E., Rhine, S. L., Flickinger, R. S., & Bennett, L. L. M. (1999). 
"Video Malaise" revisited: Public trust in the media and government. The 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 4(4), 8-23. 
Bimber, B. (1998). The Internet and political transformation: Populism, 
community, and accelerated pluralism. Polity, 31, 133-160. 
 
120
Bobo, L., & Licari, F. C. (1989). Education and political tolerance. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 53, 285-308. 
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Bourdieu, P. (1983). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), 
Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (pp. 241-258). New 
York: Greenwood press. 
Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A 
resource model of political participation. The American Political Science Review, 
89(2), 271-294. 
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes 
and consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 
999-1023. 
Brown, M. W., MacCallum, R. C., & Kim, C. (2002). When fit indices 
and residuals are incompatible. Psychological methods, 7(4), 403-421. 
Burns, N., & Kinder, D. R. (2004). The 2004 national election study. Ann 
Arbor: MI: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. 
Cappella, J. N., & Jamieson, K. H. (1997). Spiral of cynicism: The press and 
the public good. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cigler, A., & Joslyn, M. R. (2002). The extensiveness of group 
membership and social capital: The impact on political tolerance attitudes. 
Political Research Quarterly, 55(1), 7-25. 
Claibourn, M. P., & Martin, P. S. (2000). Trusting and joining? An 
empirical test of the reciprocal nature of social capital. Political Behavior, 22(4), 
267-291.  
 
121
Cohen, J. (1999). Trust, voluntary association and workable democracy: 
the contemporary American discourse of civic society. In M. E. Warren (Ed.), 
Democracy and Trust (pp. 208-248). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. 
American Journal of Sociology, 94(Supplement), S95-S120. 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Cook, K. S., & Hardin, R. (2001). Norms of cooperativeness and 
networks of trust. In K.-D. Opp & M. Hechter (Eds.), Social Norms (pp. 327-347). 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Coser, R. L. (1975). The complexity of roles as a seedbed of individual 
autonomy. In L. A. Coser (Ed.), The idea of social structure: Papers in honor of 
Robert K. Merton (pp. 237-263). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Craig, S. C. (1993). The malevolent leaders: Popular discontent in America. 
Boulder, CL: Westview Press. 
Dasgupta, P. (1998). Trust as a commodity. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: 
Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 49-72). New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Davison, W. P. (1988). Mass media, civic organizations and street gossip: 
How communication affects the quality of life in an urban neighborhood: Gannett 
Center for Media Studies. 
de Tocqueville, A. (1965). Democracy in America. Gander City, NY: 
Anchor Books. 
DeFilippis, J. (2001). The myth of social capital in community 
development. Housing Policy Debate, 12(4), 781-806. 
Delli Carpini, M., X, & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans know about 
politics and why it matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
122
Denney, W. M. (1979). Participant citizenship in a marginal group: 
Union mobilization of California farm workers. American Journal of Political 
Science, 23(2), 330-337. 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and 
controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1), 5-18. 
Donohue, G. A., Tichenor, P. J., & Olien, C. N. (1986). Metro daily 
pullback and knowledge gaps: Within and between communities. 
Communication Research, 13(453-471). 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Edwards, B., & Foley, M. W. (1997). Social capital and the political 
economy of our discontent. American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5), 669-678. 
Eliasoph, N. (1998). Avoiding politics: How Americans produce apathy in 
everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Eliasoph, N. (1999). What if good citizens etiquette requires silencing 
political conversation in everyday life? Notes from the field. Paper presented at the 
Transformation of Civic Life, Middle Tennessee State University, Tennessee. 
Erbe, W. (1964). Social involvement and political activity: A replication 
and elaboration. American Sociological Review, 24, 198-215. 
Erickson, B. H., & Nosanchuck, T. A. (1990). How an apolitical 
association politicizes. Canadian Review of sociology and anthropology, 27(2), 206-
219. 
Eveland, W. P. Jr., & Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Connecting news media 
use with gaps in knowledge and participation. Political Communication, 17, 215-
237.  
 
123
Fallows, J. (1997). Breaking the news: How the media undermine American 
democracy. New York: Vintage. 
Findahl, O., & Hoijer, B. (1981). Studies of news from the perspective of 
human comprehension. Mass Communication Review Yearbook, 2, 393-403. 
Finifter, A. W. (1970). Dimensions of political alienation. American 
Political Science Review, 64, 389-410. 
Finkel, S. E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political 
efficacy: A panel analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 891-913. 
Foley, M. W., & Edwards, B. (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal 
of Democracy, 7(3), 38-52. 
Foley, M. W., & Edwards, B. (1997). Escape from politics? Social theory 
and the social capital debate. American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5), 550-561. 
Fuchs, E. R., Minnite, L. C., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2000). Political capital and 
political participation. Paper presented at the APSA annual meeting, 
Washington, DC. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Gambetta, D. (1988). Can we trust trust? In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: 
Making and breaking cooperative relation (pp. 213-238). New York: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Gandy, O. H., & Waylly, M. E. (1985). The knowledge gap and foreign 
affairs: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Journalism Quarterly, 62, 777-783. 
Gaziano, C. (1983). The knowledge gap: An analytical review of media 
effects. Communication Research, 10, 447-486.  
 
124
Gaziano, C. (1997). Forecast 2000: Widening knowledge gaps. 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 74(2), 237-264. 
Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., & Signorielli, N. (1980). The 
"mainstreaming" of America: Violence profile no. 11. Journal of Communication, 
30(3), 10-29. 
Gibson, J. L. (1987). Homosexuals and the Ku Klux Klan: A contextual 
analysis of political tolerance. Western Political Quarterly, 40, 427-448. 
Gibson, J. L. (1992). The political consequences of intolerance: Cultural 
conformity and political freedom. American Political Science Review, 86(2), 338-
356. 
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of 
Sociology, 78(6), 1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory 
revisited. Sociological Theory, 1, 201-233. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The 
problem of embededness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
Greeley, A. (1997). Coleman revisited. American Behavioral Scientist, 
40(5), 587-594. 
Greeley, A. (n.d.). The strange reappearance of civic America: Religion and 
volunteering. Retrieved from http://www.agreeley.com/articles/civic.html. 
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (1998). Trust, mood, and outcomes of 
friendship determine preferences for real versus ersatz social capital. Political 
Psychology, 19(3), 527-544. 
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2005). Organizational membership versus 
informal interaction: Contributions to skills and perceptions that build social 
capital. Political Psychology, 26(1), 1-25.  
 
125
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Hardin, R. (1993a). Public choice versus democracy. In D. Copp, J. 
Hampton & J. E. Roemer (Eds.), The Idea of Democracy: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hardin, R. (1993b). The street-level epistemology of trust. Politics & 
Society, 21(4), 505-529. 
Hardin, R. (1999). Social capital. In J. E. Alt, M. Levi & E. Ostrom (Eds.), 
Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and 
political science (pp. 170-189). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Hardin, R. (2000). The public trust. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), 
Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries? (pp. 31-51). 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Hardin, R. (2002). Street-level epistemology and democratic 
participation. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(22), 212-229. 
Hardin, R. (2003). Social capital and trust. Unpublished manuscript. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1984). Against parsimony: three easy ways of 
complicating some categories of economic discourse. American Economic 
Review, 74(2), 88-96. 
Hooghe, M. (2002). Watching television and civic engagement: 
Disentangling the effects of time, programs, and stations. Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 7(2), 84-104. 
Horstmann, R. (1991). Knowledge gaps revisited: Secondary analyses 
from Germany. European Journal of Communication, 6, 77-93. 
Huckfeldt, R., Beck, P. A., Dalton, R. J., & Levine, J. (1995). Political 
environments, cohesive social groups, and the communication of public 
opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 1025-1054.  
 
126
Huckfeldt, R., Johnson, P. E., & Sprague, J. (2002). Political 
environments, political dynamics, and the survival of disagreement. The 
Journal of Politics, 64(1), 1-21. 
Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1987). Networks in context: The social flow 
of political information. American Political Science Review, 87(4), 1197-1216. 
Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1995). Citizens, politics, and social 
communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ikeda, K. (2002). Social capital and social communication in Japan: Political 
participation and tolerance. Retrieved from http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/ 
02-05. 
Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, well-being and democracy. In M. E. Warren 
(Ed.), Democracy and Trust (pp. 88-120). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political 
issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jackman, M. R. (1978). General and applied tolerance: Does education 
increase commitment to racial integration? American Journal of Political Science, 
22, 302-324. 
Jackman, R. W., & Miller, R. A. (1998). Social capital and politics. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 47-73. 
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (1993). LISREL8: Structural equation 
modeling with the SIMPLIS Command language. Chicago: Scientific Software 
International. 
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (1984). LISREL User's guide. Mooresville, 
IN: Scientific Software Inc.  
 
127
Kang, N., & Kwak, N. (2003). A multilevel approach to civic 
participation: Individual length of residence, neighborhood residential 
stability, and their interactive effects with media use. Communication Research, 
30(1), 80-106. 
Katz, E., & Blumler, J. G. (1973). Uses and gratification research. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 37(507-523). 
Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. (1955). Personal Influence: The part played by 
People in the Flow of Mass Communications. New York: The Free Press. 
Kim, J. (2004). "Bowling alone" isn't a cure-all: The relationship between 
social capital and political trust in South Korea. Paper presented at the European 
Consortium for Political Research, Uppsala, Sweden. 
Kingwell, M. (1995). A civil tongue: Dialogue and the politics pf pluralism. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University. 
Kleinnijenhuis, J. (1991). Newspaper complexity and the knowledge 
gap. European Journal of Communication, 6(499-522). 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic 
payoff? A cross-country. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1228. 
Knack, S., & Kropf, M. E. (1998). For shame! The effect of community 
cooperative context on the probability of voting. Political Psychology, 19(3), 585-
597. 
Knoke, D. (1990). Networks of political action: Toward theory 
construction. Social Forces, 68(4), 1041-1063. 
Kornhauser, W. (1959). The politics of mass society. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Kraut, R., Patterson, M., Lundmark, V., Kiesler, S., Mukophadhyay, T., 
& Scherlis, W. (1998). Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social  
 
128
involvement and psychological well-being? American Psychologist, 53, 1017-
1031. 
Kwak, N. (1999). Revisiting the knowledge gap hypothesis: Education, 
motivation, and media use. Communication Research, 26(385-413). 
La Due Lake, R., & Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Social capital, social networks, 
and political participation. Political Psychology, 19(3), 567-584. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). 
Trust in large organizations. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 333-338. 
Ladd, E. C. (1996). The data just don't show erosion of America's "social 
capital". The Public Perspective, 7(4), 1, 5-6. 
Ladd, E. C. (1999). The Ladd report. New York: Free Press. 
Lee, E. (2000). Knowledge gap or knowledge leveler? Paper presented at the 
International Communication Association, Washington D.C. 
Lemann, N. (1996, April). Kicking in groups. Atlantic Monthly, 22-24. 
Lemert, J. (1984). News context and the elimination of mobilizing 
information: An experiment. Journalism Quarterly, 61(243-249, 259). 
Levi, M. (1996). Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert 
Putnam's Making Democracy Work. Politics & Society, 24(1), 45-55. 
Levi, M. (1999). When good defenses make good neighbors: A transaction cost 
approach to trust and distrust. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Working 
Paper #140. 
Lin, N. (2001a). Building a network theory of social capital. In N. Lin, K. 
Cook & R. S. Burt (Eds.), Social Capital: Theory and Research (pp. 3-29). New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc.  
 
129
Lin, N. (2001b). Social capital: A Theory of social structure and action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and power: Two works by Niklas Luhmann. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Marcus, G. E., Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., & Wood, S. L. (1995). 
With malice toward some: How people make civic liberties judgments. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McBride, A. (1998). Television, individualism, and social capital. 
PS:Political Science and Politics, 31(3), 542-552. 
McClosky, H. (1964). Consensus and ideology in American Politics. 
American Political Science Review, 58, 361-382. 
McClosky, H., & Brill, A. (1983). Dimensions of tolerance. New York: 
Russel Sage. 
McLeod, D. M., & Perse, E. M. (1994). Direct and indirect effects of 
socioeconomic status on public affairs knowledge. Journalism Quarterly, 71, 
433-442. 
McLeod, J. M., Bybee, C. R., & Durall, J. A. (1979). Equivalence of 
informed political participation: The 1976 presidential debates as a source of 
influence. Communication Research, 6(4), 463-487. 
McLeod, J. M., Daily, K., Guo, Z., Eveland, W. P. Jr., Bayer, J., Yang, S., 
et al. (1996). Community integration, local media use, an democratic processes. 
Communication Research, 23(2), 179-209. 
McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., & Moy, P. (1999). Community, 
communication, and participation: The role of mass media and interpersonal 
discussion in local political participation. Political Communication, 16, 315-336.  
 
130
McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., Moy, P., Horowitz, E. M., Zhang, W., 
Zubric, S., et al. (1999). Understanding deliberation: The effects of discussion 
networks on participation in a public forum. Communication Research, 26(6), 
743-774. 
McPherson, J. M. (1981). A dynamic model of voluntary affiliation. 
Social Forces, 59(3), 705-728. 
McQuail, D. (1987). Mass communication theory: An introduction. London: 
Sage. 
Menzel, H. (1971). Quasi-mass communication: A neglected area. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 35(Autumn), 406-409. 
Meyrowitz, J. (1985). No sense of place: The impact of electronic media on 
social behavior. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Milbrath, L. W. (1965). Political participation. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Milbrath, L. W., & Goel, M. L. (1977). Political participation: How and why 
do people get involved in politics? Washington, DC: University Press of America. 
Miller, A. H. (1974). Rejoinder to "comment" by Jack Citrin: Political 
discontent or ritualism. American Political Science Review, 68, 989-1001. 
Miller, M. M., & Reese, S. D. (1982). Media dependency as interaction: 
Effects of exposure and reliance on political activity and efficacy. 
Communication Research, 9(2), 227-248. 
Mondak, J. J., & Sanders, M. S. (2003). Tolerance and intolerance, 1976-
1998. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 492-502. 
Morgan, M., & Shanahan, J. (1991). Television and the cultivation of 
political attitudes in Argentina. Journal of Communication, 41(1), 88-103.  
 
131
Moy, P., & Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Media effects on political and social 
trust. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 77(4), 730-745. 
Moy, P., Scheufele, D. A., & Holbert, R. L. (1999). Television use and 
social capital: Testing Putnam's time displacement hypothesis. Mass 
Communication & Society, 2(1/2), 27-45. 
Moy, P., Tanaka, K., Torres, M., & McCluskey, M. (2005). Knowledge or 
trust? Investigating linkages between media reliance and political 
participation. Communication Research, 32(1), 59-86. 
Mutz, D. C. (2002a). Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic 
theory in practice. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 111-126. 
Mutz, D. C. (2002b). The consequences of cross-cutting networks for 
political participation. American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 838-855. 
Mutz, D. C., & Martin, P. S. (2001). Facilitating communication across 
lines of political difference: The role of mass media. American Political Science 
Review, 95(1), 97-114. 
Mutz, D. C., & Mondak, J. J. (1998, April). What's so great about league 
bowling? Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL. 
Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a 
civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. American Political Science 
Review, 91(3), 567-583. 
Newman, R. W. (1976). Patterns of recall among television news 
viewers. Public Opinion Quarterly, 40, 115-123. 
Newton, K. (1997). Social capital and democracy. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 40(5), 575-586.  
 
132
Newton, K. (1999a). Mass media effects: Mobilization or media malaise? 
British Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 577-599. 
Newton, K. (1999b). Social and political trust in established 
democracies. In P. Norris (Ed.), Critical citizens (pp. 169-187). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nie, N. H., Junn, J., & Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and democratic 
citizenship in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1984). The spiral of silence: Public opinion - our social 
skin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Norris, P. (1996). Does television erode social capital? A reply to 
Putnam. Political Science and Politics, 29(3), 474-480. 
Norris, P. (2000a). A virtuous circle: Political communications in 
postindustrial societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, P. (2002b). Social capital and the news media. Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics, 7(1), 3-8. 
Nunn, C. Z., Crockett, H. J., & Williams, J. A. (1978). Tolerance for 
nonconformity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Offe, C. (1999). How can we trust our fellow citizens? In M. E. Warren 
(Ed.), Democracy and Trust (pp. 42-87). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Olsen, M. E. (1972). Social participation and voting turnout: A 
multivariate analysis. American Sociological Review, 37, 317-333. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
133
Ostrom, E. (1994). Constituting social capital and collective action. 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(4), 527-562. 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and 
without a sword: Self-governances is possible. American Political Science Review, 
86(404-417). 
Patterson, T. E. (2002). The vanishing voter: Public involvement in an age of 
uncertainty. New York: Knopf. 
Patterson, T. E., & McClure, R. (1976). The unseeing eye: The myth of 
television power in national election. In. New York: Putnam's. 
Paxton, P. (1999). Is social capital declining in the United States? A 
multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of Sociology, 105(1), 88-127. 
Pettigrew, T. E. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact effects on 
prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(February), 173-185. 
Petty, G. R. (1988). The interaction of the individual's social 
environment, attention and interest, and public affairs media use on political 
knowledge holding. Communication Research, 15, 265-281. 
Pfau, M., Moy, P., Radler, B., & Bridgeman, M. (1988). The influence of 
individual communication media on public confidence in democratic 
institutions. The Southern Communication Journal, 63, 98-112. 
Pollock, P. H. I. (1982). Organizations as agents of mobilization: How 
does group activity affect political participation? American Journal of Political 
Science, 26(3), 485-503. 
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern 
sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1-24. 
Portes, A., & Landolt, P. (1996, May/June). The downside of social 
capital. The American Prospect, 7(26), 18-21, 94.  
 
134
Postman, N. (1986). Amusing ourselves to death: Public discourse in the age 
of show business. London: Methuen. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern 
Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, R. D. (1995a). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. 
Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65-78. 
Putnam, R. D. (1995b). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange 
disappearance of social capital in America. PS:Political Science and Politics, 
28(4), 664-683. 
Putnam, R. D. (1996, December). The strange disappearance of civic 
America. The American Prospect, 7(24), 34-48. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone : The collapse and revival of American 
community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Rheingold, H. (1994). The virtual community: Homesteading on the 
electronic frontier. New York: HarperCollins. 
Riker, W., & Ordeshook, P. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. 
American Political Science Review, 62, 25-42. 
Robinson, J. P., & Davis, D. K. (1990). Television news and the informed 
public: An information processing approach. Journal of Communication, 40(3), 
106-119. 
Robinson, J. P., & Levi, M. (1986). The main source: Learning from 
television news. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Robinson, M. J. (1976). Public affairs television and the growth of 
political malaise: The case of "The Selling of the Pentagon". American Political 
Science Review, 70(2), 409-432.  
 
135
Rogers, D. L., Bultena, G. L., & Barb, K. H. (1975). Voluntary association 
membership and political participation: An exploration of the mobilization 
hypothesis. The Sociological Quarterly, 16, 305-318. 
Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilization, participation, and 
democracy in America. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Samuelson, R. J. (1996, April 10). 'Bowling Alone' is bunk. Washington 
Post, p. A19. 
Scheufele, D. A. (1999a). Participation as individual choice: Comparing 
motivational and informational variables and their relevance for participatory 
behavior. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Talk or conversation? Dimensions of 
interpersonal discussion and their implications for participatory democracy. 
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 77(4), 727-743. 
Scheufele, D. A. (2002). Examining differential gains from mass media 
and their implications for participatory behaviors. Communication Research, 
29(1), 45-64. 
Scheufele, D. A., Nisbet, M. C., & Brossard, D. (2003). Pathways to 
political participation? Religion, communication contexts, and mass media. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 15(3), 300-324. 
Scheufele, D. A., Nisbet, M. C., Brossard, D., & Nisbet, E. C. (2004). 
Examinig the impacts of social setting, network heterogeneity, and 
informational variables on political participation. Political Communication, 21, 
315-338. 
Scheufele, D. A., & Shah, D. V. (2000). Personality strength and social 
capital: The role of dispositional and informational variables in the production 
of civic participation. Communication Research, 27(2), 107-131.  
 
136
Scholz, J. T., & Lubell, M. (1998). Trust and taxpaying: Testing the 
heuristic approach to collective action. American Journal of Political Science, 
42(2), 398-417. 
Schudson, M. (1996, March/April). What if civic life didn't die? The 
American Prospect, 7(25), 17-20. 
Schudson, M. (1997). Why conversation is not the soul of democracy. 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 14, 297-309. 
Schudson, M. (1998). The good citizen: A history of American public life: 
Free Press. 
Schulz, W. (2001). Television and declining political trust: How Germans 
react to changes of the media system. Paper presented at the ICA. 
Shah, D. V. (1998). Civic engagement, interpersonal trust, and television 
use: An individual-level assessment of social capital. Political Psychology, 19(3), 
469-496. 
Simonson, P. (1996). Dreams of democratic togetherness: 
Communication hope from Cooley to Katz. Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication, 13, 324-342. 
Skocpol, T. (1996, March/April). Unraveling from above. The American 
Prospect, 7(25), 20-25. 
Skocpol, T. (1999, July /August). Associations without members. The 
American Prospect, 10(45), 66-73. 
Smith, R. (2002). Freedom and the tragedy of the commons: How social 
capital and interpersonal networks enable collective action. Humane Studies 
Review, 14(2). Retrieved from  http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/ 
hsr.php/58.html.  
 
137
Stolle, D. (1998). Bowling together, bowling alone: The development of 
generalized trust in voluntary associations. Political Psychology, 19(3), 497-525. 
Stolle, D., & Rochon, T. R. (1998). Are all associations alike? American 
Behavioral Scientist, 42(1), 47-65. 
Stouffer, S. (1955). Communism, conformity, and civil liberties. New York: 
Doubleday. 
Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1979). An alternative 
conceptualization of political tolerance: Illusory increases, 1950s-1970s. 
American Political Science Review, 73, 781-794. 
Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1982). Political tolerance and 
American democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Teachman, J. D., Paasch, K., & Carver, K. (1997). Social capital and the 
generation of human capital. Social Forces, 75(4), 1343-1359. 
Tichenor, P. J., Donohue, G. A., & Olien, C. N. (1970). Mass media flow 
and differential growth in knowledge. Public Opinion Quarterly, 34, 159-170. 
Turkle, S. (1996, Winter). Virtuality and its discontents: Searching for 
community in cyberspace. The American Prospect, 24, 50-57. 
Uhlaner, C. J. (1986). Political participation, rational actors, and 
rationality: A new approach. Political Psychology, 7(3), 551-573. 
Uhlaner, C. J. (1989). "Relational goods" and participation: 
Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action. Public Choice, 62, 253-
285. 
Uslaner, E. (1998). Social capital, television, and the "mean world": 
Trust, optimism, and civic participation. Political Psychology, 19(3), 441-467.  
 
138
Uslaner, E. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Van de Kragt, A. J. C., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Braver, S. R., & 
Wilson, L. A. I. (1986). Doing well and doing good as ways of resolving social 
dilemmas. In H. A. M. Wilke, D. M. Messick & C. G. Rutte (Eds.), Experimental 
social dilemmas (pp. 177-203). New York: Verlag Peter Lang. 
Verba, S. (1965). Organizational membership and democratic consensus. 
Journal of Politics, 27(3), 467-497. 
Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). Participation in America: Political democracy 
and social equality. New York: Harper & Row. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: 
Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H. E., & Nie, N. H. (1995). American 
citizen participation study, 1990. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university consortium for 
political and social research. 
Viswanath, K., & Finnegan, J. R. (1996). The knowledge gap hypothesis: 
Twenty-five years later. Communication Yearbook, 19(187-227). 
Weber, L. J., & Fleming, D. B. (1983). Media use and student knowledge 
of current events. Journalism Quarterly, 60(356-358). 
Wilkins, K. G. (2000). The role of media in public disengagement from 
political life. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 44(4), 569-580. 
Wills, G. (2000, July). Putnam's America. The American Prospect, 11(16), 
34-37. 
Wilson, J., & Musick, M. (1998). The contribution of social resources to 
volunteering. Social Science Quarterly, 79(4), 799-814.  
 
139
Woolcook, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: 
Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27, 
151-208. 
Wyatt, R., Katz, E., & Kim, J. (2000). Bridging the spheres: Political and 
personal conversation in public and private spaces. Journal of Communication, 
50(1), 71-92. 
Yamagishi, M., Cook, K., & Watabe, M. (1998). Uncertainty, trust, and 
commitment formation in the United State and Japan. American Journal of 
Sociology, 104(1), 165-194. 
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the 
United States and Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 129-166. 
Zellman, G., & Sears, D. O. (1971). Childhood origins and tolerance for 
dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27, 109-136. 
 
 